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Foreword
At the World Bank, we view nutrition as a foundational factor of development. Investing 
in nutrition will contribute to achieving the World Bank’s dual goals of ending extreme poverty 
and promoting shared prosperity. The coordinated support of the international community is 
important to optimizing the rising trend in nutrition investment, which was galvanized by the 
global Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement, and reaffirmed at the 2012 World Health Assembly 
where world leaders committed to reaching six global nutrition targets by 2025.
The cost of underinvestment in nutrition is immense. Undernourished mothers give birth to 
chronically ill and cognitively deficient children. Intergenerational malnutrition reinforces the 
cycle of poverty and prevents countries from reaching their development potential. World Bank 
President Jim Yong Kim observed that “One of the biggest obstacles to [a] better world is our col-
lective failure to help parents provide adequate nutrition…to children during the first 1,000 days.” 
Governments must invest in a skilled, healthy, productive workforce to compete in the global 
digital economy. And that investment needs to start with nutrition in the first 1,000 days of life.
The World Bank is well positioned to advise its country clients on scaling up effective nutrition 
interventions and to collaborate with partners to coordinate and enhance investments in nutri-
tion. Well-chosen incentives could increase the possibility that countries will succeed in imple-
menting effective nutrition interventions to achieve better outcomes for their populations. Until 
recently, incentive mechanisms in support of nutrition results have been underutilized. 
The report, Incentive Mechanisms to Accelerate Improved Nutrition Outcomes—and the accom-
panying Practitioner’s Compendium—provide important guidance for cost-effective multisectoral 
efforts to scale up nutrition programming by incentivizing nutrition interventions. Financial in-
centives are one tool to support nutrition interventions. However, incentives need to be carefully 
chosen, underpinned by a clear theory of change, and designed for particular contexts and objec-
tives. When a decision is taken to use financial incentives, the report and compendium offer oper-
ational guidance to task teams and leaders. They highlight the potential challenges and strengths 
of the various mechanisms, and include country examples and nutrition indicators to monitor 
progress at the levels where the mechanism would exert its influence, i.e., national, sub-national, 
facility, community, households, or individuals.
I encourage managers to familiarize themselves with the available mechanisms to incentivize 
nutrition in operations for country clients—particularly in countries most heavily burdened by 
malnutrition. Malnutrition is a global crisis causing unnecessary pain, suffering, and economic 
losses.  We must accelerate our response to this global development challenge and become more 
innovative in our approaches, including in our use of incentives. The World Bank is committed to 
improving nutrition outcomes in partnership with the international community.
Timothy Grant Evans
Senior Director
Health, Nutrition and Population Global Practice
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Executive Summary
Scaling up Nutrition through Incentives
Good nutrition reduces mortality and poverty, improves children’s school 
readiness and performance, and increases a country’s shared prosperity and 
sustainable economic growth. Poor nutrition leads to reduced immunity, in-
creased susceptibility to disease, impaired physical and mental development, 
and decreased productivity. Intergenerational undernutrition reinforces the 
cycle of poverty and obstructs development.
Reducing maternal and child malnutrition has become a global development 
priority driven by the multinational Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement. 
Increasingly, the international community recognizes nutrition as a vital as-
pect of health policies. Integrating nutrition within a country’s universal health 
care (UHC) policy is paramount to achieving the right to health for all.
The evidence indicates that a set of highly cost-effective nutrition-specific 
interventions need to be urgently scaled up to maximize reductions in mal-
nutrition. A sustainable and comprehensive reduction in malnutrition also 
requires nutrition-sensitive interventions implemented through diverse sec-
tors, including agriculture, education, water and sanitation, the private sector, 
and social protection. Successful multisectoral nutrition interventions require 
strong coordination and accountability mechanisms at various levels of gover-
nance. An important ingredient for successfully scaling up a country’s multi-
sectoral nutrition plans are the right incentives.
The right mix of incentives could increase the possibility that nutrition 
interventions will be implemented to achieve targeted results, but the systematic use of 
incentives to achieve nutrition results in World Bank operations remains limited. The World 
Bank has extensive experience supporting the design, implementation, and evaluation of financial 
incentive mechanisms, and it is well positioned to use that knowledge to support country clients 
and collaborate with partners to enhance the efficiency of delivering nutrition interventions. 
This report provides operational guidance to World Bank project teams considering including 
nutrition objectives in projects. It is intended for non-technical staff to support their clients’ ef-
forts to enhance the nutritional impact of World Bank country investments. The report provides 
practical advice to design and implement nutrition interventions in future operations based on 
Good nutrition 
reduces mortality 
and poverty, 
improves 
children’s school 
readiness and 
performance, 
and increases a 
country’s shared 
prosperity and 
sustainable 
economic growth.
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a review of past successful and less successful attempts. The recommendations are organized by 
type of financial incentive mechanism, which correspond to the specific levels where the mech-
anisms exert their influence, i.e., national, sub-national, facility, community, households, or indi-
viduals, and also provides information on the use of non-financial incentives. 
Why invest in nutrition?
Malnutrition is a driver of poverty. Reducing malnutrition is essential to achieving the World 
Bank’s goals of eliminating extreme poverty and enhancing shared prosperity. Evidence-based 
nutrition interventions are consistently a high investment priority in economic analyses. Every 
dollar invested in proven nutrition interventions in developing countries yields about $18 dollars 
in economic returns.
A relatively small “window of opportunity” exists during which most of 
the damage from malnutrition occurs—damage that is mostly irreversible and 
detrimental throughout a person’s life. This golden window is referred to as 
the first thousand days—from conception to the end of the first two years of a 
child’s life. To prevent irreversible developmental damage, good nutrition is 
critical for prospective mothers well before pregnancy and conception. A set of 
cost-effective nutrition-specific interventions have proven highly successful 
in improving nutrition. 
What are incentive mechanisms?
Incentives motivate individuals to perform an action. Incentives can be classi-
fied as financial, moral, coercive or natural / intrinsic. Incentive structures are 
a central feature of economics and are described as the interaction between a 
principal, who applies the incentive, and an agent, who receives the incentive. 
Greater incentives are assumed to lead to more effort and better performance. 
Financial incentives can have two kinds of effects: a direct price effect, which 
makes the incentivized behavior more attractive, and an indirect psycholog-
ical effect.  The psychological effect can reinforce the price effect, but it can 
sometimes work in opposition to the price effect by crowding out the incen-
tivized behavior.
How to select nutrition incentive mechanisms?
Nutrition programs and interventions can be implemented at different levels 
of the system. When planning a country’s nutrition program, the first step is 
to identify the key nutrition challenges and the different system levels affected 
to define a theory of change to inform where to focus the effort and what ap-
proach or instrument might be most effective. At each level, it is useful to an-
alyze how financial and non-financial incentives are aligned (or not) to either 
encourage or block actions. Financial and non-financial incentives can have 
unintended consequences. Their introduction into operations needs to be carefully considered in 
each context—when a decision is made to use them.
The World Bank’s main instruments and approaches, and the levels at which they are typically 
used to improve nutrition, are depicted in the figure below.  Because the instruments and ap-
proaches are results-based and have associated financing, they are effectively financial incentive 
mechanisms.  This report also discusses the importance of non-financial incentives and provides 
some examples that could be used in nutrition operations.
A relatively 
small “window 
of opportunity” 
exists during 
which most  
of the 
damage from 
malnutrition 
occurs— 
damage that 
is mostly 
irreversible and 
detrimental 
throughout a 
person’s life.
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Financial Incentive Mechanisms Applied at Different Levels
Source: Authors. 
Choosing the right nutrition incentives for the right level  
Successfully scaling up a country’s multisectoral nutrition plans requires the right incentives, 
including facilitating effective inter-sectoral collaboration and coordination. The financial and 
non-financial incentive instruments used effectively in health, education, and social protection 
programs can be equally effective in achieving behavior change to improve nutrition either as 
part of broader World Bank operations or as stand-alone nutrition projects or programs. 
The use of incentives in World Bank-financed operations to achieve nutrition objectives has 
been modest to date and deserves more attention. This document explains the various financial 
and non-financial incentives and at which level they could be used. Explicit indicators should be 
included to measure nutrition results within the health, agriculture, education, social protection, 
water and sanitation, and other relevant sector operations. An essential element for the success 
of incentivized nutrition operations is to identify appropriate indicators and to establish robust 
systems to monitor and verify results in order to reward good performance promptly.
To assist task-teams and leaders in developing, implementing, and monitoring incentivized 
programs for nutrition, as well as in incorporating nutrition results in other relevant operations, 
a Practitioner’s Compendium compliments this report. The compendium offers practical infor-
mation on how to plan incentivized operations for improving nutrition results for World Bank 
client countries, along with country examples and nutrition indicators for monitoring progress. 

Introduction
Why nutrition?
Good nutrition reduces mortality and poverty, improves children’s 
school readiness and performance, and increases a country’s shared 
prosperity and sustainable economic growth.1 Poor nutrition leads to 
reduced immunity, increased susceptibility to disease, impaired physi-
cal and mental development, and decreased productivity. Malnourished 
mothers give birth to sickly and cognitively deficient children. Irre-
versibly damaged children bear the burden of their malnourishment 
throughout their lifetimes—unable to contribute their full potential to 
national development. 
Intergenerational undernutrition reinforces the cycle of poverty and 
obstructs development.2 Even though the cycle is not irreversible, a 
special focus on malnourished mothers is required because they have 
a higher likelihood of giving birth to malnourished children. Reduc-
ing maternal and child malnutrition has become a global development 
priority driven by the multinational Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) move-
ment.3  Increasingly, the international community recognizes nutrition as a vital aspect of health 
policies, requiring multisectoral coordination. Integrating nutrition within a country’s universal 
health care (UHC) policy is paramount to achieving the right to health for all.
 A set of cost-effective nutrition-specific interventions have proven highly successful in improv-
ing nutrition.4 Nutrition-sensitive interventions are typically delivered through health systems 
 
Nutrition-specific:  
Interventions that have an immediate 
and direct impact on maternal, fetal, 
and child nutrition and development, 
including adequate food and nutrient 
intake, feeding, caregiving and 
parenting practices, and low burden of 
infectious diseases.
Nutrition-sensitive:  
Interventions that address the 
underlying and basic determinants of 
maternal, fetal, and child nutrition and 
development
1 Repositioning Nutrition as Central to Development: A Strategy for Large Scale Action. 2006. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
2 H.F. Delisle. 2008. Poverty: the double burden of malnutrition in mothers and the intergenerational impact. Annals of the 
New York Academy of Science 1136: 172–84.
3 See www.scalingupnutrition.org.
4 Z.A. Bhutta et al. 2013. Evidence-based interventions for improvement of maternal and child nutrition: what can be done and 
at what cost? The Lancet Maternal and Child Nutrition Series 382: 452–77.
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and other programs such as cash transfer programs and community-based approaches. However, 
a sustainable and comprehensive reduction in malnutrition requires nutrition-sensitive interven-
tions implemented through diverse sectors, such as agriculture, education, water and sanitation, 
the private sector, and social protection. Successful multisectoral nutrition interventions require 
strong coordination and accountability mechanisms at various levels of governance countrywide.
An important ingredient to successfully scaling up a country’s multisectoral nutrition plans 
are the right incentives—including effective inter-sectoral collaboration and coordination. The 
focus on incentives is relatively new in the nutrition field. Even though the international com-
munity is clear on what needs to be done to reduce malnutrition, how to ensure targeted in-
terventions to achieve the intended nutrition impact remains only partially evident. The right 
incentives could increase the possibility that nutrition interventions will be implemented to 
achieve targeted results.
Most nutrition research has focused on the basic science or the efficacy of interventions in rel-
atively smaller and more controlled projects. Evaluations of larger-scale programs often demon-
strate a gap between the nutrition impact of interventions—tested through efficacy studies in 
controlled settings—and the impact of interventions at the large-scale and 
programmatic level. Meanwhile, the focus on financial and non-financial 
incentives has grown considerably in related fields, such as public health 
and social protection.  
The World Bank has an important role to play in support of country cli-
ents and in collaboration with partners to enhance the efficiency of deliver-
ing nutrition interventions. The World Bank has extensive experience sup-
porting the design, implementation, and evaluation of financial incentive 
mechanisms. In some cases, incentivizing nutrition outcomes has been a 
specific focus, but generally, the potential for using incentive mechanisms 
for nutrition remains underutilized.
Operational guidance for nutrition incentives
This document provides specific operational guidance to World Bank proj-
ect teams that are considering including nutrition objectives in projects. It 
is intended for non-nutrition specialist World Bank staff to support their 
clients’ efforts to enhance the nutritional impact of World Bank country 
investments. This document and the related Practitioner’s Compendium 
offer practical advice to design and implement nutrition interventions in 
future operations based on a review of past successful and less successful 
attempts.  The review is organized by type of financial incentive mechanism, which corresponds 
to the specific levels where the mechanisms exert their influence, i.e., national, sub-national, fa-
cility, community, households, or individuals. 
The operational guidance for utilizing financial incentive mechanisms to improve nutrition 
answers the following questions. 
• What has been the World Bank’s experience using financial and non-financial incentive 
mechanisms to achieve nutrition results? 
• What types of financial and non-financial incentive mechanisms have proven successful, 
and what features have led to success?
• What are the challenges and limitations of using incentive mechanisms to achieve nutri-
tion results?
An important 
ingredient to 
successfully 
scaling up 
a country’s 
multisectoral 
nutrition plans 
are the right 
incentives.
5 See also Improving Nutrition Through Multisectoral Approaches. 2013. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
• What specific lessons would inform the potential greater use of these mechanisms for nu-
trition impact?
The document has two parts and annexes. Part I presents the main forms of malnutrition and 
their determinants, high impact evidence-based interventions to reduce malnutrition, and the 
cost benefit and effectiveness of the interventions. 
Part II defines incentive mechanisms and presents the main financial incentive mechanisms 
the World Bank employs to structure its financing to support nutrition. The analysis of the mech-
anisms is based on a review of World Bank grey literature, e.g., project appraisal documents, aide 
memoires, implementation status reports, and implementation completion reports, as well as 
semi-structured interviews with a range of World Bank staff with direct experience designing or 
supporting the implementation of operations with a nutrition focus. A May 2016 workshop with 
practitioners provided additional specificity.  
Annex 1 contains a summary analysis of peer-reviewed published evidence on financial incen-
tive mechanisms to achieve nutritional impact. The review draws mainly from the literature on 
incentives in public health, which most closely resembles the challenge of incentivizing nutri-
tion. Annex 2 contains a nutrition glossary, and Annex 3 contains references for additional nutri-
tion resources.
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PART I.  
Investing in Nutrition:  
What, Why, and How?
What is malnutrition?
Malnutrition encompasses all categories of poor nutrition caused by insufficiency, deficiency 
and/or excess. Malnutrition includes undernutrition and over-nutrition, each with specific defi-
nitions and indicators.6 One or more types of malnutrition can coexist in one household and even 
in one single individual. The main forms of undernutrition are stunting or chronic malnutrition, 
wasting or acute malnutrition, underweight, low birth weight, low body mass index, and micronu-
trient deficiencies. Overweight and obesity is a condition characterized by excess body fat.
Why does malnutrition matter? 
Malnutrition is a driver of poverty. Reducing malnutrition is essential to achieving the World 
Bank’s goals of eliminating extreme poverty and enhancing shared prosperity. Malnutrition 
drives poverty in three main ways.7  
1. Direct losses—Malnutrition causes poor physical status resulting in enormous direct 
productivity losses.8
2. Indirect losses—Indirect losses in productivity are caused by poor cognitive develop-
ment due to malnutrition, which results in poor school performance and drop-outs.9
3. Increase in costs—Malnourished children and adults are more likely to be chronically 
sick and have a higher risk of hospitalization and longer hospital stays. Their households be-
come impoverished due to higher health costs.  
6 Repositioning Nutrition as Central to Development: A Strategy for Large Scale Action. 2006. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
 7 Ibid.
 8 J. Hoddinott et al. 2008. Effect of a nutrition intervention during early child. The Lancet 371: 411–16.
 9 S. Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007. Developmental potential in the first 5 years for children in developing countries. The 
Lancet 369: 60–70.
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Figure 1. Cycle of Poverty and Malnutrition 
Source: World Bank. Repositioning Nutrition as Central to Development: A Strategy for Large-Scale Action. 2006.
Malnutrition is a driver of disparities. While malnutrition levels in developing countries are 
often high even in the households from the highest income quintiles — highlighting the role of 
knowledge and behaviors — households from the lowest income quintiles often have rates of mal-
nutrition that are twice as high as those from the highest income quintiles.10  
Figure 2. Stunting Disproportionately Affects the Poor
10 C. Bredenkamp et al. 2014. Persistent inequalities in child undernutrition: Evidence from 80 countries, from 1990 to today. 
International Journal of Epidemiology 1–8.
Source: Data Source: Most recent nationally representative nutrition survey as reported in WHO, UNICEF, and World Bank 2015
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How does malnutrition affect sectoral objectives?
Malnutrition is a barrier to achieving a range of sectoral development objectives.11  The following 
sectors, among others, are directly affected by malnutrition.
Health. Stunted and / or wasted children are at a much greater risk of dying than 
well-nourished children.12 Malnutrition is estimated to be an underlying cause of 45 
percent of child mortality. The health sector’s objective of reducing child mortality 
is dependent on reducing malnutrition. In addition, reducing undernutrition in early 
life, the development of overweight/obesity and noncommunicable diseases in adult-
hood will slow escalating health care costs.  
Agriculture. Lost physical productivity due to malnutrition is a barrier to in-
creasing agricultural productivity, particularly in agriculture systems heavily reliant 
on physical labor.  
Education. Malnutrition is a barrier to generating high learning outcomes. Chil-
dren may suffer up to a 25 IQ point loss due to malnutrition.13 They are unlikely to 
perform as well in school as their better nourished contemporaries, even if the condi-
tions for learning in the education system exist, e.g., effective teachers, well-equipped 
schools, etc. 
Social Protection. Because well-nourished individuals have stronger physical 
immunity, they are more resilient and able to cope with shocks. They are also less 
likely to be poor, and those who are poor are better equipped to transform a cash 
transfer and accompanying measures into an opportunity to become more produc-
tive economically. 
Water and sanitation. Communities affected by undernutrition often have 
limited access to safe water and sanitation, reinforcing the causes of undernutrition 
and emphasizing the need for multifaceted solutions. Effective water and sanitation 
interventions include improved household toilets or latrines, improved water supply, 
safe household water management, including treatment and storage, and handwash-
ing with soap. The safe handling, preparation and storage of food are also important.
Is nutrition a good investment?
Evidence-based nutrition interventions consistently appear as a high investment priority in eco-
nomic analyses. Every dollar invested in proven nutrition interventions in developing countries 
yields approximately $18 dollars in economic returns.14 
In 2012, the 176 members of the World Health Assembly endorsed a Comprehensive Imple-
11 Improving Nutrition through Multisectoral Approaches. 2013. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
12 A.L. Rice et al. 2000. Malnutrition as an underlying cause of childhood deaths associated with infectious diseases in devel-
oping countries. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 78 (2000).
13 B. Lozoff, E. Jimenez, and J.B. Smith. 2006. Double Burden of Iron Deficiency in Infancy and Low Socio-economic Status: A 
Longitudinal Analysis of Cognitive Test Scores to 19 Years. Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine 160 (11): 1108–1113.
14 J. Hoddinott, H. Alderman, J.R. Behrman, L. Haddad, and S. Horton 2013. The economic rationale for investing in nutri-
tion. Maternal and Child Nutrition 9 (Suppl. 2): 69–82. Median estimate for a sample of 17 high burden countries used by the 
authors.
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mentation Plan on Maternal, Infant, and Young Child Nutrition.15 The plan included global tar-
gets focused on six areas: stunting, exclusive breastfeeding, wasting, anemia, low birth weight, 
and overweight. The targets aim to boost investment in cost-effective interventions. Some of the 
targets have been included by world leaders in the second Sustainable Development Goal, which 
is to end malnutrition in all forms by the year 2030.16 Despite the ambition of the targets, it is 
possible to achieve the World Health Assembly goals with the right actions, rapid scale up, and 
adequate financing. Building on previous analysis,17 the World Bank and partners have recently 
estimated that the world will need approximately $50 billion to reach the stunting target and 
$70 billion to realize the four key targets, including reducing stunting, over ten years.18 While 
this amount may seem daunting, it represents $5–7 billion per year across official development 
assistance, domestic (public and households), and innovative financing sources across the globe. 
The incentives described in this report will contribute to accelerating the scale up of the effective 
actions.19  
Table 1 demonstrates the results of detailed costing developed by the World Bank for nutri-
tion interventions in four countries. The methodology focused on well-proven cost-effective in-
terventions—a package of 10 nutrition-specific and some nutrition-sensitive interventions—for 
these particular contexts. Scaling up a set of ten critical nutrition-specific interventions is highly 
cost-effective when considered as a package. The analysis also modeled the cost-effectiveness 
of different scale up scenarios, offering insights into ways in which the impact of investing in 
nutrition interventions can be maximized under budget constraints. The methodology used to 
estimate the costs and benefits of nutrition investments is being replicated in other countries and 
is an important first step to drive political commitment and action, and to enhance the allocative 
efficiency of nutrition resources.20 
15 WHO. 2012. Report of the Sixty-Fifth World Health Assembly, 12.
16 See Sustainable Development Goal 2.2 targets. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E.
17 S. Horton, M. Shekar, C. McDonald, A. Mahal, and J.K. Brooks. 2010. Scaling Up Nutrition; What Will it Cost? Washington, 
DC: The World Bank.
18 M. Shekar, J. Kakietek, J. Dayton-Eberwein, and D. Walters. Washington, DC: The World Bank Forthcoming 2016.
19 Ibid.
20 M. Shekar, J. Dayton Eberwein, and J. Kakietek, 2016. The costs of stunting in South Asia and the benefits of public invest-
ments in nutrition. Maternal and Child Nutrition 12 (Suppl. 1): 186–195.
Table 1. Costs and Benefits of Investing in a Package of 10 Nutrition-Specific  
Interventions (US$)
COUNTRY
REGION
(YEAR)
ANNUAL 
PUBLIC  
INVESTMENT 
REQUIRED
ANNUAL ESTIMATED BENEFITS COST-EFFECTIVENESS ESTIMATES
DALYS
Averted
Lives
Saved
Cases of  
stunting 
averted
Cost per 
DALY 
averted
Cost 
per life 
saved
Cost per 
case of 
stunting 
averted
WTP   
threshold
(GDP per 
capita)
DRC (2015) 371 M 2.6 M 77,000 1 M 143 4,929 226  454
Mali (2015) 64 M 509,302 14,000 260,000 178 6,276 344 715
Nigeria (2014) 837 M 6.3 M 180,000 3 M 141 4,865 292 3,010
Togo (2015) 13 M 115,295 3,000 60,000 127 4,635 238 636
Source: M. Shekar et al., 2016.
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What are the causes and determinants of malnutrition?
Good nutrition is the result of a combination of factors and dependent on multiple sectors.21 Good 
nutrition is essential for healthy development at various stages of the life cycle and critical for nor-
mal infant development during the first 1,000 days—from conception to a child’s second birthday. 
Malnutrition is due to immediate, underlying, and basic causes, which are briefly described. 
Immediate Causes. Malnutrition is the result of a combination of immediate causes related 
to food and nutrient intake and health. To be well nourished, young children must have sufficient 
quantities of a balanced and nutritious diet at regular intervals; adequate feeding and caring prac-
tices, including parental stimulation; and a low burden of infectious diseases.  Nutrition-specific 
interventions aim to improve the immediate causes of malnutrition.  
Underlying Causes. More distal underlying causes of malnutrition are embedded at the house-
hold and community levels. These include factors such as food security—which includes physical 
and economic access to food and nutrient diversity, and the use of food, including intra-household 
cultural norms related to food distribution, which often disadvantage women. Underlying causes 
related to feeding and caring resources include intra-household distribution of tasks, e.g., men’s par-
ticipation in child care, availability of time and financial resources to ensure children are properly 
stimulated, etc. Equally important is access to quality health services to protect especially women 
and children against infection and to offer treatment when required. The role of a hygienic environ-
ment—including safe water and good sanitation—is a critical underlying cause of good nutrition. 
Behaviors and gender norms are important factors for each of these underlying causes. A range of 
nutrition-sensitive interventions address the underlying causes of malnutrition. 
Basic Causes. Institutional, political, and economic issues such as poverty reduction and econom-
ic growth, governance and stewardship capacities, environmental safeguards, and trade and patents 
issues, including the role of the private sector, are at the roots of the basic causes of malnutrition.  
Figure 3. Interventions to Reduce Malnutrition
Source: The Lancet Series. 2013. 
21 The Lancet Series on Maternal and Child Nutrition. 2013. http://www.thelancet.com/series/maternal-and-child-nutrition.
What nutrition-specific interventions work?
There exist well proven nutrition interventions and these should be scaled up.22  In 2008 and 
2013, The Lancet, a leading medical journal, published two groundbreaking nutrition-focused 
issues reviewing the current evidence for effective interventions to reduce child and maternal 
malnutrition in developing countries. The analysis indicated that the total number of deaths in 
children younger than five years could be reduced by 15 percent if the affected populations had 
access to ten evidence-based nutrition interventions delivered at 90 percent coverage to the tar-
get population. Also, access to and uptake of iodized salt could alleviate iodine deficiency and 
improve health outcomes. Implementing the interventions at scale would avert about a fifth of 
the existing burden of stunting. The list of recommended high-impact interventions is included 
in Table 2. They are all nutrition-specific interventions focused on the proximate causes of mal-
nutrition.  
Table 2. High-Impact Nutrition-Specific Interventions
NUTRITION INTERVENTION WHAT DOES IT INVOLVE? WHY DOES IT MATTER?
PROMOTION OF  
BREASTFEEDING
• Community-based education 
and behavior change
Early breastfeeding reduces 
all-cause and infection related 
neonatal mortality by 44–45%
COMPLEMENTARY FEEDING
• Community-based education 
and behavior change
• Provision of complementary foods
Complementary feeding results in 
increased height and weight
MANAGEMENT OF SEVERE  
ACUTE MALNUTRITION
• Community-based therapeutic 
feeding using ready-to-use-foods
Provision of ready-to-use-foods 
leads to faster weight gain, improved 
recovery, and reduced mortality
VITAMIN A
SUPPLEMENTATION
• Provision of supplements
• Delivery through existing healthcare 
platform e.g., child health days
Vitamin A supplementation reduces  
all-cause and diarrhea related mortality
SALT IODIZATION
• Iodization of salt at 
point of processing
• Targeted to pregnant women
Salt iodization increases birth 
weight and leads to 10–20% 
higher developmental scores
HANDWASHING  
WITH SOAP
• Community education 
and behavior change
• Communications e.g., mass media
Handwashing with soap reduces 
the risk of diarrhea
THERAPEUTIC ZINC  
FOR DIARRHEA
• Access to zinc supplements 
for children 
• Delivery through existing 
antenatal care platforms
Zinc treatment for diarrhea leads to a 
46% reduction in all-cause mortality
IRON AND FOLIC ACID
• Provision of supplement 
to pregnant women 
• Delivery through existing 
antenatal care platforms 
Iron and folic acid supplementation 
for pregnant women leads 
to higher birth weight 
MULTIPLE MICRONUTRIENT  
POWDERS
• Provision of micronutrient 
powders to children 
• Demand generation including 
strategic communication   
Significant reductions in anemia
DEWORMING
• Delivery of deworming drugs
• School-based or through 
healthcare system
Treating children infected with 
worms increases weight
IRON FORTIFICATION OF STAPLES • Product fortification at point of  
processing e.g., flours
Iron fortification results in 41% 
reduction in the risks of anemia
Source: Children’s Investment Fund Foundation.
22 Ibid.
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What nutrition-sensitive interventions work?
The Lancet nutrition series also reviewed evidence concerning the nutritional effects of nutri-
tion-sensitive programs in four sectors: agriculture, social safety nets, early child development, 
and schooling.23 While the need for nutrition investments in agriculture is clear, the available 
evidence of the nutritional effect on agricultural programs is inconclusive—except for increased 
intake of vitamin A from the biofortification of orange sweet potatoes. 
The same review also reported that individual safety net studies show some effects from nu-
trition interventions on younger children exposed to the interventions for longer durations, but 
the nutritional effects have been weak. This probably has been due to inadequate nutrition goals, 
insufficient actions, and poor service quality. However, combined early child development and 
nutrition interventions show promising effects on child development, and in some cases, on im-
proved nutrition, although not yet tested at scale. Parental schooling is strongly associated with 
better child nutrition. The effectiveness of emerging school nutrition education programs needs 
to be tested, however. The Lancet review noted that even though many of the programs reviewed 
were not originally designed to improve nutrition, they nevertheless have great potential to do so. 
When in the life cycle is nutrition critical?
A relatively small “window of opportunity” exists during which most of the damage from mal-
nutrition occurs—damage that is mostly irreversible and detrimental throughout a person’s life. 24 
This golden window is referred to as the first thousand days—from conception to the end of the 
first two years of a child’s life.
Figure 4. Stages in Human Brain Development
Source: C. Nelson, in From Neurons to Neighborhoods, 2000.
23 Ibid. 
24 National Research Council and Institute of Medicine.2000. From Neurons to Neighborhoods: The Science of Early Childhood 
Development. Committee on Integrating the Science of Early Childhood Development. Jack P. Shonkoff and Deborah A. Phillips, 
eds. Board on Children, Youth and Families, Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. Washington, DC: 
National Academy of Press.
25 Shekar et al., 2016.
26 World Bank. Scaling Up Nutrition: A Framework for Action, 2010.
To prevent irreversible developmental damage, good nutrition is critical for prospective moth-
ers well before pregnancy and conception. Interventions targeting adolescent girls and their fam-
ilies, including male members, are particularly important to encourage delaying early marriages 
and pregnancies, which result in the fetus and the young growing woman competing for available 
nutrients. Also required are knowledge and services to prepare them physiologically for an even-
tual pregnancy, i.e., adequate weight, good micronutrient status. 
How has nutrition evolved as a global development priority?
Nutrition is increasingly considered a foundation for sustainable and inclusive development. The 
evidence base regarding what works is robust. Table 3 outlines how key international actors have 
gradually galvanized around the challenge. The Scaling Up Nutrition movement has been in-
strumental in coalescing a wide range of partners from key sectors globally—but also in the more 
than fifty SUN countries—around clear nutrition objectives supported by financing, processes, 
and tools to support a scaled up nutrition response. Countries are mobilizing domestic financing 
and international donors and other development partners are renewing their commitment to the 
issue.25 
Table 3. Key Developments in the Global Fight against Malnutrition
 DATE EVENT
 2000 Launch of the Millennium Development Goals
 2006 World Bank publishes Repositioning Nutrition as Central to Development
 2008 The Lancet launches first series on Maternal and Child Undernutrition
 2010  The World Bank in partnership with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, USAID, and the 
governments of Japan and Canada launch the Scaling up Nutrition (SUN) movement26 
 2012  World Health Assembly endorses the Comprehensive Implementation 
Plan on Maternal, Infant, and Young Child Nutrition
 2013  Nutrition For Growth pledging conference and raise US$ 4 billion 
in commitments for nutrition-specific interventions
 2013  The Lancet launches the second series on Maternal and Child 
Nutrition (undernutrition and overweight)
 2014  FAO / WHO Second International Conference on Nutrition Rome 
Declaration on Nutrition and Framework for Action
 2015  UN summit on the post-2015 agenda adopts the Sustainable Development Goals   
SDG 2.2 focuses on nutrition (stunting, overweight, and anemia)
 2016 UN launches Decade of Action on Nutrition
 2016  African Development Bank launch African Leaders for Nutrition to sustain 
African political will and leadership on nutrition investment
 April 2016 World Bank hosts high level event on Early Childhood Development / Stunting
 October 2016  World Bank hosts Heads of State / Finance Ministers Summit on Investing in Young Lives
Source: Shekar et al., 2016.
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The World Bank has been a major contributor in recent months to the high level dialogue on 
scaling up actions to prevent stunting, led by President Jim Yong Kim. Although the momentum 
in support of nutrition is building fast within the institution, great effort has been expended over 
time to generate greater awareness of the multisectoral importance of nutrition. In the early to 
mid-2000s, very few countries had nutrition on their development agendas, and nutrition was 
not a priority for most donors or the World Bank. In 2004–2005, the World Bank had very few 
staff working on the issue, very little analysis of what works, low institutional and senior man-
agement commitment, and minimal investments. The 2006 publication of the Bank report Re-
positioning Nutrition as Central to Development was a catalyst in reviving interest in nutrition 
within the institution, as well as amongst key development partners and governments. A rapid 
and significant scale up of staffing for nutrition within the World Bank followed in 2007–2008. 
The seminal Lancet Nutrition Series was published in 2008, followed by the World Bank’s 2010 
publication of Scaling Up Nutrition: What Will It Cost?—the first such global nutrition costing.27
The global movement, Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN), was launched at the World Bank in April 
2010, with support from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, USAID, and the Governments of 
Canada and Japan. In 2013, DfID and the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF) orga-
nized the “Nutrition for Growth” event on the margins of the Olympic Games, which generated 
$4 billion in donor pledges for nutrition. A follow-on media event is planned on the margins of 
the Rio Olympics in August 2016. The World Bank’s commitment to nutrition is growing fast—not 
just in the health sector—but across the key sectors of agriculture, social protection, education, 
water and sanitation. IDA and IBRD allocations to nutrition are increasing, supported by part-
ners such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Power of Nutrition, and the Global Fi-
nancing Facility for Every Woman Every Child.28 
27 M. Shekar et al., 2016.
28 Ibid.
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PART II.  
Financial and Non-Financial 
Incentives to Enhance  
Nutrition Results
This section is a review of the World Bank’s experience with various financial incentive mech-
anisms. They are used to enhance nutrition results by motivating change in behaviors at the na-
tional, sub-national, community, facility, household, and individual levels. This section draws 
mainly from experience in World Bank-financed operations and includes World Bank-specific 
incentive instruments and other instruments used more broadly by governments and develop-
ment partners. The section also contains a discussion of some of the non-financial incentives that 
complement financial incentives at all levels of the system. 
This review documents past operational experience that used incentive mechanisms to encour-
age nutrition programming and abstracts the potential strengths and challenges for each mech-
anism. This report and the accompanying Practitioner’s Compendium will aid task teams and 
their leaders to use the appropriate incentive mechanisms more effectively in future operations 
to achieve better nutrition outcomes. The information is primarily derived from experiential evi-
dence from key informant interviews and a literature review, which is included in Annex 1.
What are incentive mechanisms?
In its simple form, an incentive is something that motivates an action. Incentive structures are a 
central feature of economics and are described as the interaction between a principal, who applies 
the incentive, and an agent, who receives the incentive. The basic tenet is that greater incentives 
lead to greater effort and better performance.”29 Incentives can be classified into four categories:
• Financial incentives: when an agent can expect some form of material reward, e.g., money, 
in exchange for a particular behavior.30 
• Moral incentives: when a choice is widely regarded as the “right thing to do,” or particu-
larly respectable, or conversely, when the failure to act in a certain way is unacceptable. 
An individual acting on a moral incentive obtains in return a sense of self-esteem, approval 
or even admiration from his community, or guilt, condemnation or ostracism if s/he acts 
against a moral incentive.31 
29 U. Gneezy, S. Meier, and P. Rey-Biel. 2011. When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work to Modify Behavior. J Econ Perspect 25 
(4): 191.
30 K. Dalkir. 2013. Knowledge management in theory and practice. New York: Routledge.
31 Ibid.
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• Coercive incentives: when failure to act a particular way results in physical force being 
used against the agent by others in the community.32 
• Natural of intrinsic incentives: this is a category of incentives that are driven from the 
personality of the agent, such as curiosity, fear, the pursuit of truth, wanting to contribute 
to society, etc.33 
Financial incentives can have two kinds of effects: a direct price effect, which make the incen-
tivized behavior more attractive, and an indirect psychological effect. The psychological effect can 
reinforce the price effect but can sometimes also work in opposition to the price effect crowding 
out the incentivized behavior.34 
The World Development Report 2015 argues that much of economic policy re-
lies on a model of human behavior that takes little account of human sociality. 
Yet the fact that humans think socially “has enormous implications for decision 
making and behavior, and thus for development.”35 This report outlines the fol-
lowing four implications of human sociality on development interventions.
First, economic incentives are not necessarily the best or the only way to 
motivate individuals. The drive for status and social recognition means that 
in many situations, social incentives can be used alongside, or even instead of 
economic incentives, to elicit desired behaviors. Moreover, economic incen-
tives can both “crowd out” intrinsic motivations and “crowd in” social prefer-
ences. The role for incentives in policy is more complicated than is generally 
recognized.
Second, humans act as members of groups. Interventions that increase in-
teractions or create groups among individuals who have a common interest in 
goals, such as breastfeeding, may facilitate the achievement of these objectives.
Third, there is a widespread willingness of individuals to cooperate in the 
pursuit of shared goals. Most people prefer to cooperate as long as others are 
cooperating. This implies that making behavior more visible and “marketing” 
adherence to norms, such as having men play an important role in child feed-
ing practices, may be a cost-effective means of increasing contributions to col-
lective goods. 
Finally, human societies develop social norms as a means of coordinating 
and regulating behavior. Societies can get stuck in collective patterns of be-
havior that do not serve their interest. Since social norms are often taken for 
granted, socially appropriate behaviors by individuals can lead to suboptimal 
social outcomes. Norm change may sometimes be a necessary component of 
social change.36 
Incentives vary across cultures and over time because social incentive structures are estab-
lished by different forms of social interactions that take place within cultural norms and expec-
tations that vary geographically and over time. What is valued or is deemed unacceptable in one 
culture may not be perceived the same way in other cultures or within the same culture over 
time. We tend to perceive the world around us through mental models that reflect the shared 
understandings of our community.37 For example, volunteerism by community health workers to 
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32 Ibid.
33 D.C. McClelland. 1987. Human Motivation. Cambridge University Press Archive.
34 Gneezy et al., 2011. 192.
35 World Bank. 2015. World Development Report 2015. Mind, Society, and Behavior. Washington, DC. 54.
36 Ibid. 55.
37 Ibid. 62. 
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improve nutrition may be valued, and thus boost the worker’s self-esteem in a country that recog-
nizes that nutrition is a national development priority. In another setting, where volunteerism is 
not as valued, or where wealth accumulation confers social status, and where malnutrition is not 
considered a social priority, financial incentives may be more effective or even necessary. Even 
for an individual, such as a community health worker, the relative importance of a certain type 
of incentive may change over the course of a lifetime, e.g., starting with the self-esteem related 
to the prestige of having been selected, supplemented by intrinsic motivation and, over time, a 
potential gradual movement towards greater attention to financial incentives.
In this report and the Practitioner’s Compendium, we focus primarily on financial incentive 
mechanisms, but we recommend that due attention also be given to non-financial incentives, i.e., 
moral, coercive, and natural / intrinsic incentives. Depending on the core constraints that are de-
fined in the theory of change analysis,38 a mix of financial and non-financial incentives will need 
to be used to achieve results. Part II of this report includes a discussion of 
some of the non-financial incentives that may be considered to scale up nu-
trition programs. That section is not meant to be a comprehensive review. 
Rather, it serves to remind the reader that a balance between financial and 
non-financial incentives is required. We recommend consulting the World 
Development Report 2015, which contains a rich discussion on this topic.39  
Because a range of incentives act on an individual concurrently, and be-
cause human behavior is complex, it is very difficult to predict the effect 
that a specific incentive will have over the short, medium, and long terms. 
This risk highlights the importance of establishing strong monitoring sys-
tems to track the results to be achieved, as well as the potential unintended 
consequences of certain incentives, e.g., their effect on the motivation and 
self-esteem of workers.  
What has been the World Bank’s experience using 
financial incentive mechanisms for nutrition?
Despite the World Bank’s longstanding and wide geographic experience us-
ing the financial incentive mechanisms reviewed in this report, the Bank’s 
experience using these mechanisms for the specific objective of achieving 
nutritional impact has been limited. A rapid review of the Health Results 
Innovations Trust Fund portfolio—which was instrumental in introducing 
performance-based financing in several World Bank health sector operations—revealed that 
only eight projects included nutrition indicators. The indicators almost exclusively focused on 
only two nutrition interventions: the treatment of severe acute malnutrition and growth mon-
itoring. This probably reflects the low priority that was accorded to nutrition in the early to 
mid-2000s, but also demonstrates the need for the World Bank to become more creative in using 
financial incentive mechanisms to scale up its operations to meet the global stunting targets. For 
each mechanism, there have been a few cases—and for cash transfers, more than a few cases—of 
using mechanisms to achieve nutrition results, which have generated rich lessons for this re-
port. However, the relatively thin experience does indicate the need to continue measuring and 
documenting lessons from implementation.   
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38 See C. Valters. Theories of Change; Time for a Radical Approach to Learning in Development. London, UK: Overseas Develop-
ment Institute, 2015.
39 World Bank, 2015.
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What is the evidence on the use of financial incentive mechanisms 
for nutrition?
We conducted a literature review to assess the impact of eight mechanisms, all of which the 
World Bank has incorporated into projects and initiatives to incentivize results for various nu-
trition-related outcomes. The mechanisms include: development policy lending (DPL), pro-
gram-for-results (PforR), performance based budgeting (PBB), performance based financing 
(PBF), performance based contracting (PBC), conditional cash transfers (CCT), unconditional 
cash transfers (UCT), and public works programs (PWP). In the review, we considered evidence 
from experimental and quasi-experimental studies. Refer to Annex 1 and the full review for more 
information about the methods and results.
There is evidence that the financial incentive mechanisms reviewed can 
positively influence nutrition and related outcomes among children. How-
ever, most of the evidence has focused on health outcomes and health care 
utilization. Far less attention has been paid to nutrition, with the notable 
exception of cash transfers. Scant evidence exists about the impact of incen-
tive mechanisms on nutrition-related health behavior, such as breastfeed-
ing and complementary feeding practices. No studies were identified that 
evaluated the impact of development policy loans, program-for-results or 
public works programs on any of the nutrition-related outcomes of interest.
In many of the studies reviewed, there was variation in the effects of treat-
ment between subgroups, e.g., rural versus urban children, and children in 
different age groups, etc. Also, the results were not statistically significant 
for all nutrition outcomes or for all types of health care services.
The design and implementation of the mechanisms often differs mark-
edly across countries, which might explain some of the variations in study 
findings. The duration of follow-up also differed across studies. Therefore, 
it is difficult to draw general conclusions on the mechanisms’ impact.
Not surprisingly, three of the four incentive mechanisms for which little 
or no evidence was found, i.e., DPLs, PfoR financing, and PBB, are mecha-
nisms that aim to shape international, national, or sub-national priorities. 
It is difficult to evaluate such types of mechanisms using randomized con-
trolled trials or other rigorous study designs.
Important questions remain about each of the financial incentive mech-
anisms. The sustainability and cost-effectiveness of these mechanisms is 
uncertain, particularly when it comes to scaling up nutrition programs. It 
is also difficult to disentangle the effects of individual mechanisms when 
multiple mechanisms are present in a country. Additional research is needed to shed light on the 
relative importance of supply-side and demand-side measures, although that is likely to be context 
specific.
Finally, most of the studies reviewed have been unable to pinpoint the pathways by which 
the incentive mechanisms improve nutrition. In CCT programs, for instance, the dissemination of 
health, nutrition, and hygiene information to mothers and pregnant women—which is a compo-
nent of most transfer programs—is probably a key factor driving improvement in child nutrition. 
Children are also required to take nutritional supplements as part of some CCT programs. More-
over, the conditions attached to the cash transfers, as well as the size of the transfers, usually dif-
fer across programs. Most studies have not been able determine which of these factors are most 
important in explaining any observed impact. In short, more research is needed to determine the 
usefulness of these mechanisms to improve nutrition in low- and middle-income countries.
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How to select nutrition incentive mechanisms?
Nutrition programs and interventions should be implemented at different levels of the system. 
When planning a country’s nutrition program, first identify the key nutrition challenges and the 
different system levels affected to determine where to focus the effort and what approach or in-
strument might be most useful. To target the incentive mechanism to the right behaviors, a clear 
theory of change needs to be formulated and borne in mind. The results chain should include 
actions / behaviors at various levels, so that appropriate behaviors are incentivized at the relevant 
levels. The theory of change would take account of policies and programs at the government lev-
els, supply-side readiness at the service delivery levels, the social mobilization and empowerment 
at the community level, and the eating / feeding / caring behaviors at the household and individu-
al levels. The ability to verify the achievement of targets—and to counter verify independently as 
necessary—is often a critical factor in selecting financial incentive indicators. 
The basic framework for the causation of malnutrition is the starting point for the theory of 
change. Three broad sets of determinants are often cited as resulting in good or bad nutrition. 
They are household food security, access to quality health care services, and behavioral factors—gen-
erally referred to as the triad of food, health, and care. Therefore, the policies, programs, services, 
and behaviors that affect any of these three sets of determinants need to be clearly identified, and 
the incentive instruments need to be applied at the appropriate levels where the instruments are 
expected to be effective.
At each level, it is useful to analyze how financial and non-financial incentives are aligned (or 
not) to either encourage or block actions.  
The World Bank’s main instruments and approaches, and the levels at which they are typically 
used to improve nutrition, are depicted in Figure 5. Because the instruments and approaches are 
results-based and have associated financing, they are effectively financial incentive mechanisms.
Figure 5. Financial Incentive Mechanisms Applied at Different Levels 
 
Source: Authors.
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Which incentives should be used at what levels?
  National LeveL
Nutrition must be considered a national policy and an investment priority. Incentives need to be 
shifted to key ministries so they invest budgetary resources and the extra time and effort neces-
sary to collaborate inter-sectorally. Each ministry will need to adjust its work program to become 
more nutrition-sensitive. Strong leadership will also create the enabling conditions required for 
the private sector to play its role in financing nutrition. 
In countries where nutrition is not sufficiently prioritized, international financial incentives 
such as investments from multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental institutions, as well as 
from innovative financing mechanisms—such as the Power of Nutrition trust fund and the Glob-
al Financing Facility for Every Woman, Every Child trust fund—can serve as effective financial 
incentives to raise the profile of malnutrition as a development challenge and to encourage the 
mobilization of domestic public and private financing. 
In countries without a nutrition policy or with a policy that needs updating, a set of policy 
actions with specific triggers could be identified that act at the national level. The actions could 
form the basis for a Development Policy Financing (DPF) or a Program for Results (PforR)/ Dis-
bursement Linked Indicator (DLI) operation. It is unlikely that a DPF would be developed spe-
cifically for nutrition. Nonetheless, nutrition policy actions could be included in broader DPF 
operations. Even though most PforR / DLI operations may not focus entirely on nutrition, nutri-
tion results could be part of an agriculture or health sector PforR, for example. Entirely nutrition 
operations do exist, however. Performance Based Financing (PBF) can also be used at the national 
level to incentivize better performance by key governmental bodies that have been identified as 
constraints in the theory of change analysis, e.g., food safety and fortification regulatory bodies. 
  
  Sub-National Level
In countries with a federal system, it is important to consider how incentive mechanisms could 
sharpen the focus on nutrition results during the intergovernmental resource allocation process, 
including equalization measures. Nutrition programs need to be well financed within national 
to sub-national transfer schemes, and incentives need to be created to achieve nutrition results. 
Nutritional status data could also be considered as one dimension, affecting the relative size of 
transfers to the sub-national level. For example, provinces with higher stunting rates would re-
ceive an additional budgetary allocation to reduce stunting.
Performance Based Budgeting (PBB) is a financial instrument used in this case to incentivize 
at the nexus between the national and the sub-national levels. Nutrition policy measures, trig-
gers, and targets need to be defined and financed according to their achievement. The approach 
can also be used to create competition between sub-national units. Sub-national units which 
achieve the greatest nutrition results or achieve their targets the fastest can be rewarded with 
higher levels of transfers. PforR / DLI operations can also include indicators that incentivize 
the achievement of nutrition results through national to sub-national financial flows. PBF can 
also be used at the sub-national level to incentivize the achievement of nutrition results, e.g., 
performance contracts with Provincial Health Directorates should include nutrition-related 
performance indicators.
 
  Facility Level
Several nutrition-specific interventions are provided to individuals through service delivery sys-
tems. Interventions mainly have been delivered through the health system, e.g., health clinics, 
and hospitals. But some interventions could also be delivered through schools, agriculture ex-
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tension services, community-driven development platforms, etc. At the service delivery level, 
workers must have the ability and motivation to include nutrition services in the basic package 
of services offered.  
Performance Based Financing (PBF) is a mechanism that acts on the incentive structure main-
ly at the service delivery level, although it is increasingly used at other levels such as national 
and sub-national levels within the health system. PBF could play a role in realigning incentives 
to ensure that workers are motivated and well equipped to deliver nutrition interventions. PBF 
could also be used to ensure that the medicine supply chain is incentivized to guarantee that the 
nutrition products are available to health facilities at the right times and in the correct qualities, 
e.g., zinc tablets, iron tablets, vitamin A capsules, and supplementary food for treatment of severe 
acute malnutrition.  
Most importantly, because of its strategic purchasing through relative pricing, PBF can pow-
erfully signal which services should be prioritized. PBF pricing can also be designed to target 
specific groups, e.g., the poorest households. It may also be a tool to target households with the 
highest stunting. Through the quality checklist and the related supervision (a non-financial in-
centive), PBF can also be a powerful approach to improving the quality of nutritional services 
provided, e.g., improving maternal counselling related to iron supple-
mentation during pregnancy to improve compliance. The involvement of 
community-based organizations in the counter-verification of results—to 
complement verification by government entities—offers the potential to in-
crease community awareness of nutrition and social accountability of ser-
vice delivery.
Performance Based Contracting (PBC) links payments to performance, as 
measured by predetermined output indicators. Although all contracts are 
expected to have a performance clause—and could be terminated in the case 
of non-performance—PBC links payment to performance more explicitly 
and based on the delivery of specific services or outputs. PBC has tended 
to be used to contract health services to non-state entities mainly in fragile 
states and tends to have less stringent verification mechanisms than PBF.
 Community Level 
Almost all nutrition interventions require some level of behavior change by 
household members or by service delivery workers. Incentives must first be 
in place to enable communities to recognize the problem of malnutrition 
and its implications for their future and then prioritize actions to reduce the 
problem. Given its widespread manifestation and relative invisibility, child 
malnutrition often goes unnoticed in communities, i.e., it is “normal” for a high proportion of chil-
dren to be stunted. Community Driven Development (CDD) and Community-Based Performance 
Based Financing (PBF) could be useful approaches to reducing malnutrition in communities.  
Community-driven development provides grants to communities to develop projects to address 
problems prioritized by the community. The community grants are generally not results-based, 
that is the financing is provided to communities on the basis of a plan, not on the basis of the 
results achieved. Nevertheless, the fact that funds are provided to a community constitutes a 
financial incentive. Because child malnutrition is often difficult to perceive by individuals, how 
can its importance be raised to a high community priority? Education and sensitization about 
malnutrition’s consequences can help CDD programs become effective tools for communities to 
prioritize nutrition. 
Community-based PBF is a more recent approach and an extension of facility-based PBF. It 
can be used to provide financial incentives to communities to achieve specific results, including 
Almost all 
nutrition 
interventions 
require some 
level of behavior 
change by 
household 
members or by 
service delivery 
workers.
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a range of nutrition results that are best achieved at community level. However, verifying certain 
results remains a challenge.
 Household Level
Key decisions affecting the nutritional status of mothers and children are made at the household 
level. In many developing countries, households provide a very important share of the nutri-
tion financing. Households pay for such inputs as food, micronutrient supplements, preven-
tive and curative health care, schooling, etc. Intra-household gender dynamics—particularly the 
woman’s extent of control over the usage of household resources—often determines the nutri-
tion-sensitivity of the intra-household resource allocations. Women’s time and energy expendi-
ture have an important impact on maternal and child malnutrition and are critical for improved 
nutrition. Some nutrition-related health services can be provided at the 
household level.
Cash Transfers (CT) are powerful tools for nutrition improvement, wheth-
er they have co-responsibilities or not. They provide additional resources 
to poor households to procure essential nutrition inputs. The information 
that often accompanies the cash transfer can be a powerful non-financial 
incentive to enable the household members to make informed decisions 
on the use of their household resources. Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) 
serve as a financial incentive to boost household demand for key services, 
many of which are essential inputs for improved nutrition, e.g., antenatal 
visits, child immunization, and school attendance by girls. 
Household Level Performance Based Financing (PBF) is a relatively new 
approach that could yield benefits for nutrition. This form of PBF usually 
involves incentivizing health workers to conduct household visits. Based 
on a rapid assessment, the household and the worker agree on a house-
hold “action plan,” which is tracked through subsequent household visits, 
and its results are incentivized financially. Both the health worker and the 
household could be incentivized through the result-based action plans. If 
nutrition improvement is an objective of these visits and the assessment, 
this form of PBF could become a powerful tool for increasing the role of 
households in their own nutritional improvement.
Public Works Programs, because they offer low wages, are good at attracting the poorest of the 
poor. They also provide great opportunities for inter-sectoral action as the benefits go beyond 
health or nutrition and could yield broader developmental impact. They enhance the sense of 
pride and self-respect among beneficiaries since they are paid in return for work performed. 
They provide a lot of flexibility to the households in terms of how the compensation is utilized. 
The newer generation of public works programs is experimenting with non-traditional em-
ployment which can contribute to nutrition, such as child care, community kitchens, and school 
feeding. In Djibouti, for example, public works have partnered with the health system to iden-
tify malnourished children in the families of the beneficiary workers, providing nutrition ser-
vices if they exist. Public works agencies are accustomed to infrastructure work. It is a mindset 
change to have them work on social sector activities. When combined with appropriate educa-
tional programs, the additional income could be put to good use and enhance food security, and 
household nutrition status.
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Financial Incentive Mechanisms: Strengths and Challenges
The incentive mechanisms are categorized by the levels at which they operate, i.e., government: 
national and sub-national, health facility, community, household, and individual levels (see Fig-
ure 5). For each level, we document the following: (1) a description of the mechanism; (2) the 
mechanism’s potential strengths; (3) the potential challenges; and (4) examples of countries that 
have tried the instruments.
  Government Level: National and Sub-National
• Development Policy Financing (DPF)
Definition
• DPF combines the objective of reducing a government’s fiscal deficit with sectoral 
or macro-level developmental objectives by incentivising policy reforms. Disburse-
ments are based on predetermined policy triggers which are linked to the govern-
ment completing reform actions.
• IDA / IBRD funds flow into the government budget and the country systems are 
used. The amount of IDA / IBRD financing is not necessarily linked to the cost of the 
reform.
• DPFs cannot be used to impose reforms without sufficient country ownership and 
commitment—an important prerequisite for success. 
• The World Bank does not prescribe activities or inputs to be financed from the IDA 
/ IBRD funds, which may be spent on anything as long as the agreed reforms are 
achieved—except a short negative list as may be agreed between the Word Bank and 
the government.
Potential Strengths 
• Can unblock policy constraints. DPFs could be useful to nutrition programs if the 
policy environment is the binding constraint to achieving nutrition outcomes, e.g., 
agricultural policies, food subsidies, gender policies, etc., and if strong government 
commitment exists (or could be developed) for specific reform measures to remove 
the constraint. Agriculture policies are closely linked to nutrition, and so are social 
safety net programs. A national policy on ensuring universal health coverage could 
have a beneficial impact on nutrition, if nutrition services are included in the benefits 
package. Food safety legislation, regulation of baby formula foods, and food fortifica-
tion with micronutrients are other relevant policy areas for nutrition. A DPF could 
facilitate moving such policies in the right direction.
• May generate greater ownership and sustainability. DPFs entail no micromanage-
ment by the World Bank in terms of activities carried out or expenditures incurred. 
The country’s own systems are used. Well-designed DPFs usually ensure that the 
incentivised reforms have strong national ownership and commitment. The benefits 
are therefore likely to be systemic and more sustainable. Sustainability is critical to 
nutrition, which is a long-term and continual objective.
• Potential to raise the profile of nutrition. Adding nutrition into a DPF could help 
raise the importance of nutrition, positioning it as a national development priority at 
the same level as other policy reforms included in the DPF.
• Attractive to governments. DPFs are quick disbursing and contribute to the coun-
try’s fiscal health and sector-specific goals. A DPF is attractive to ministries of fi-
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nance, which typically are the World Bank’s counterparts in negotiating the World 
Bank’s country assistance. Adding a nutrition-related policy trigger to a DPF could be 
a smart strategy in an otherwise less than enthusiastic environment for stand-alone 
nutrition operations.
Potential Challenges
• Does not address implementation challenges. DPFs are not the instrument of choice 
when the main constraint to improved nutrition is implementation, rather than the 
policy environment, which is often the case. In such contexts, an operational level 
incentive instrument may be warranted, rather than a policy reform measure.
• Requires that malnutrition be recognised as a national priority. In order for a gov-
ernment to decide to include nutrition in a DPF, the country’s malnutrition challenge 
and its economic implications will need to be understood by policy-makers (partic-
ularly in the central ministries such as finance and planning), which is often not the 
case.
• Does not address socio-cultural or behavioral challenges. In many countries, the 
core challenge to improving nutritional status may be socio-cultural or behavioral 
at the household or community level. A DPF alone would not be suitable instrument 
to address these constraints.
• Reforms may be reversed. Changes in the government or policymakers may result 
in the reversal of reforms if it was merely a high-level decision. The DPF must be 
designed carefully to ensure that the disbursement triggers fully institutionalize the 
reform and render a reversal difficult. Monitoring the trigger actions closely is an 
essential prerequisite for success.
• No guarantee of increased allocations to nutrition. There is no guarantee that IDA 
funds will be spent on nutrition services or programs since the World Bank does not 
PERU P116264 
RESULTS & ACCOUNTABILITY (REACT) PROGRAMMATIC DPL 
Project development objective (PDO). 
Nutrition-specific objectives are to 
(i) increase demand for nutrition 
services by strengthening the 
operational effectiveness of the 
Juntos Conditional Cash Transfer 
(CCT) program; and (ii) improve 
coverage and quality of the supply of 
basic preventive health and nutrition 
services in the communities covered 
under the Articulated Nutritional 
Program (PAN), including Juntos.
Results of interest. REACT DPL series 
supports policies that are expected 
to lead to (i) improved parental 
understanding of expected outcomes 
in education, health, and nutrition; (ii) 
improved outcomes in second grade 
literacy, especially in rural schools; 
(iii) reduced maternal and neonatal 
mortality; and (iv) better nutrition 
outcomes. The government set a 
target of reducing undernutrition 
by 5 percent in five years.
Indicators. As a DPL, this operation does 
not have “indicators” in the conventional 
sense of the term. However, it included 
the following “prior actions” specific 
to nutrition: MINSA has changed SIS 
norms to include the CRED (child 
growth and development) protocol; 
Goals for CRED production are agreed 
between the health sector and the 
PBB system for each health executing 
unit; Ministry of Finance increased the 
2010 budget for CRED by 330 percent, 
compared to the 2009 budget, and 
allocated the additional funds to regions 
with a low level of CRED spending 
relative to their malnutrition levels.
Operational modality. Activities to 
support both objectives include a 
strong emphasis on promoting good 
governance to monitor the impact 
of the government programs such 
as Juntos. A manual and supporting 
communication materials were 
developed for Community Nutrition 
Promoters, and the expected height 
gain in the first two years of life 
was popularized. The operation is 
adapted to respond to the country’s 
results-based financing strategy and 
provides direct support to PAN. 
Evaluation: After 10 years, the results 
are remarkable—stunting decreased 
from 28 percent to 14 percent.  
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track its funds separately under a DPF. The funds are comingled in the government 
budget. Therefore, unless the policy reform pertains directly to providing more nu-
trition resources, the DPF alone may not achieve an increased allocation.
Examples of Country Experience
India, Mozambique, Palestine, Peru
•  Program for Results (PforR) and Investment Project Financing  
with Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs)
 Definition
• PforR is a relatively new lending instrument which links IDA / IBRD development 
financing to results and moves from the “project approach” towards a “program ap-
proach”, whereby the World Bank is financing a “slice” of a government program. 
Prior to the PforR, to financially incentivise certain results, teams used Disbursement 
Linked Indicators (DLIs) within Investment Lending—currently called Investment 
Project Financing (IPF). Although many operations still use DLIs under IPFs, as a 
proxy for PforR, both instruments essentially adopt the same incentivising principle 
that seeks to finance outputs rather than inputs. Therefore, we treat PforR and DLI 
operations together.
• Under PforR and DLI, disbursements from the World Bank to the country are based 
on achieving predetermined targets or results, rather than inputs purchased. Results 
could be outputs or outcomes, but are usually defined in terms of outputs—some-
times called intermediate outcomes. In practice, many DLI operations use process 
milestones as “results” or “proxy results.”
• The World Bank does not prescribe the activities and expenditures for a PforR or 
DLI operation. The funds go to the treasury and may finance a specific program, e.g., 
the budget of the Ministry of Health or the HIV/AIDS or the maternal and child 
(MCH) programs. As long as the results are achieved, the money can be spent on any-
thing within the program. In the case of an IPF with DLIs, disbursements are made 
against a list of pre-agreed “eligible expenditures.” 
• Disbursements are based on achieving specific targets which are usually confirmed 
through independent verification. Within that framework, some prorate the dis-
bursement proportionately to how much of the target is met, while others disburse 
on an all-or-none basis, i.e., partial achievement or underachievement of targets mer-
its zero disbursement. A delayed achievement of targets can result in delayed dis-
bursement or disqualification of the amount linked to the delayed result. 
• Although PforR and DLI operations tend to incentivize the national level, they can 
also be used directly at the sub-national level, e.g., in a province / state in a large 
country, or to incentivize national to sub-national transfers in a manner similar to 
performance-based budgeting. 
Potential Strengths
• May lead to greater ownership and sustainability. PforR / DLI operations entail 
no micromanagement by the World Bank, like the DPF. In the case of the PforR, the 
country’s own systems are used. Therefore, the results are likely to be more systemic 
and sustainable.
• Provides flexibility in implementation. PforR / DLI operations place less focus on 
inputs and process. Although some level of attention is necessary at these stages 
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of the development cycle to understand any problems in case the results are not 
achieved. This approach empowers managers, and provides flexibility on ways to 
achieve the results. Nutrition programs could particularly benefit from such delega-
tion of authority, since they often require innovation at the grassroots level.
• Enhances accountability for achieving results. With the strong focus on results, 
the responsibility for achieving them is placed squarely on the government. If re-
sults are not achieved, the government does not receive the funds. If results are 
delayed, disbursements are also delayed or cancelled. The PforR / DLI instrument 
directly incentivises performance and enhances accountability by shifting the fo-
cus from project administration processes (e.g., volume of procurement transac-
tions) to results. 
• Can increase the visibility of nutrition programs. The focus on results (and on the 
resources that get released when the results are achieved) can provide additional 
visibility to nutrition within the wide range of priorities faced by governments in 
program implementation. 
• Can incentivise healthy competition. It is possible to design these operations to 
introduce competition between sub-units of government (e.g. provinces, states or 
districts) on the timing for the achievement of results, such that the first few sub-
units to achieve a particular result would get an additional financial incentive. 
• Greater likelihood of achieving results. If the operation is well designed, i.e., appro-
priate indicators with realistic targets are selected, a clear verification protocol is 
agreed upon, and the necessary monitoring systems are established, the likelihood 
of successfully achieving the agreed upon results is high.
Project development objective (PDO). 
To (i) strengthen the Integrated Child 
Development Services (ICDS) policy 
framework, systems and capacities, 
and facilitate community engagement, 
to ensure greater focus on children 
under three years of age; and (ii) 
strengthen convergent actions for 
improved nutrition outcomes.    
Results of interest. Improved sys-
tems in terms of planning, record-
ing, reporting and monitoring of 
information, improved delivery of 
services, capacity-building of the 
frontline workers to improve mater-
nal, infant, and young child feeding 
behaviors among pregnant and 
lactating women and their children.
Indicators. PDO indicators include: An-
ganwadi Centers (AWCs) implementing 
the inter-personal communication (IPC) 
activities focused on infant and young 
child feeding (IYCF) practices; and proj-
ect states in which pilots of “convergent 
nutrition action” have been implement-
ed and evaluated in at least one dis-
trict. Thirteen DLI milestones were set; 
all of them are system improvement 
indicators, e.g., real-time ICT-based 
M&E system with standardized oper-
ating procedures and specifications 
for hardware; people trained in the 
system or on specific nutrition mod-
ules, outreach and community-based 
processes such as monthly events held. 
Service delivery outputs are monitored 
as non-DLI, e.g., pregnant and lactat-
ing women, children (with proportion 
of female children amongst these), 
and adolescents who have benefit-
ted from the services. No behavioral 
outcomes are being measured.  
Operational modality. Of the 13 DLI, 
six are under the responsibility of the 
central government and seven are at 
the state level. The center has $7 mil-
lion for its six DLIs. Additional incentive: 
Flexifund / Challenge Fund ($5 million) 
for the first three states that meet 
each of the DLIs. The seven that belong 
at the state level, $25,000 per DLI, 
could be used for CCT or PBF or such 
approaches. The first three states to 
achieve each DLI get an additional in-
centive amount. Under the restructured 
design, interventions are focused on 
behavior change for nutrition primarily 
by building worker capacities to counsel 
for behavior change, through better 
outreach, and to focus on children 0–3 
years of age, e.g., improved breastfeed-
ing / complementary feeding practices. 
Innovations include the introduction 
of a mobile app that allows Anganwa-
di workers to enter data, generates 
due lists, helps daily work-planning, 
sends SMS alerts, promotes better 
growth-monitoring, generates the 
growth chart, and has BCC videos.   
INDIA P121731 
ICDS SYSTEM STRENGTHENING NUTRITION IMPROVEMENT PROJECT (ISSNIP)
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Potential Challenges
• Capacity of the government to deliver. As the World Bank focuses more on outputs 
and outcomes and leaves it largely to the government to reach the results using its 
own processes and inputs, PforR / DLI operations adopt a hands-off approach, which 
assumes robust governance systems and the government’s capacity to plan and imple-
ment its programs to achieve the agreed results. These assumptions may not always 
hold true, especially for ministries responsible for nutrition which are often weaker. It 
is sometimes necessary to design “hybrid” operations in which the focus is mainly on 
incentivising results but which also contain a more traditional input-driven form of 
technical assistance to enhance capacity to deliver. 
• Reluctance by governments to accept the risk of non-performance.  Governments of-
ten may be reluctant to accept the risk of incurring expenditures without guaranteed 
financing. Often their systems are not very flexible to manage that risk. Even though 
the first year’s disbursement are made as an advance, the subsequent year’s financing 
depends on concrete targets being met, which means that there is a real risk of funds 
not flowing. In nutrition programs involving regular service delivery or cash distri-
bution, such stoppage of fund-flow could be seriously detrimental to the population.
• Complex operations. PforR/DLI instrument may not be suited for very complex oper-
ations with too many monitored results. The more indicators, the less their monetary 
value since the total envelope is fixed and numerous indicators would be more diffi-
cult to monitor. 
• Selecting the right indicators. Certain service-oriented indicators are easier to mea-
sure, report, and pay against, e.g., vitamin A supplementation, and growth monitoring. 
Certain others, especially community level indicators, like exclusive breastfeeding are 
difficult to measure, forcing us to settle for knowledge indicators rather than actual 
behaviors. More creativity is needed.  
• Limiting the number of indicators. Typically, health and nutrition operations have 
numerous results of interest. To make the operation manageable, the list of indicators 
must be kept short, usually less than 10. Some indicators of interest must be omitted 
from being linked to financing, which is feasible if a robust set of tracer indicators is 
sufficient for the absence of others. The omitted indicators can be included in the re-
sults framework and monitored without being linked to disbursement. This position-
ing, however, would affect the level of priority of those indicators.
• Results must be achieved in a short timeframe. The PforR / DLI approach cannot di-
rectly incentivise results that take longer than a year to manifest, e.g., behavior change 
or nutritional status improvements, because disbursements cannot wait for those re-
sults to be demonstrated. Therefore, establishing measurable intermediate results is 
critical and could serve as a good proxy for the ultimate outcome of interest. This 
challenge can be mitigated by “breaking down” results with longer gestation periods 
into specific intermediate results which can each be incentivised.
• Potential to miss some important results. Due to the necessary selectivity of indicators 
linked to financing, other important results could be neglected. This risk is particularly 
challenging for a complex area like nutrition, with a wide spectrum of results of interest.
Examples of Country Experience 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India (national nutrition project as well as projects in the states 
of Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh), Indonesia, Laos, Morocco, Myanmar, 
Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Tanzania
42 Incentivizing Nutrition: Incentive Mechanisms to Accelerate Improved Nutrition Outcomes
• Performance Based Budgeting (PBB) 
Definition 
• PBB is a mechanism by which a higher level of government allocates resources to a 
lower level of government, based on the latter’s performance measured by agreed in-
dicators and targets. For example, the Ministry of Finance might allocate the budget 
for the Ministry of Health based on the past year’s performance. Or in a federal sys-
tem, the central government might allocate the state, provincial or district budgets 
on the basis of past performance. PBB usually involves a MOU or similar arrange-
ment between the financing entity and implementing entity.  
• PBB is not the usual way of budgeting in most developing countries. Budgets are gen-
erally developed using historical data of allocations and expenditures and based on 
inputs rather than outputs. A reformist and forward looking government and leader-
ship is critical for PBB to work.
Potential Strengths 
• Budgets reflect priorities and reforms. If nutrition results are included in the perfor-
mance measures that influence the budgetary allocation, sub-national priorities are 
likely to move in a direction favorable to nutrition programs. 
• Closer to service delivery and the needs of people. PBB moves the incentives and 
risks to the sub-national levels, which are closer to the action. PBB empowers sub-na-
tional level managers and provides flexibility on ways to achieve the results. This 
devolved accountability and the related flexibility is important for nutrition given 
that the approaches may vary based on the specific determinants and the socio-eco-
nomic composition of the populations. 
• Enhances accountability. PBB is likely to be attractive to the ministries of finance 
(MOFs) because an enhanced level of accountability exists prior to budgetary allo-
cation. PBB allows the MOF the flexibility to allocate resources to the ministries and 
departments that have demonstrated a record of producing better results. This may 
be particularly useful for nutrition programs, some of which have a legacy of poor 
performance, which has discouraged central ministries from further allocations. 
• Can incentivise healthy competition. It is possible to design these operations to 
introduce competition between sub-units of government, e.g., provinces, states or 
districts.
• Alignment with the policy framework. PBB is suitable for achieving program re-
sults when the national policy environment is already conducive to program im-
plementation at sub-national levels, and robust monitoring systems are available, 
along with the necessary information base. PBB can be used to incentivize shifts in 
delivery that are introduced in recent policy reforms.
• May increase financial allocations to nutrition. Nutrition could benefit from PBB 
because often, a constraint is the insufficient resource allocation—a problem at the 
operational level rather than the policy level.
Potential Challenges 
• Requires a change in mindset and strong leadership. PBB entails an entirely new 
way of planning, budgeting, and financial management, as most governments use 
historical budgeting. Even though PBB has strong potential, it may be difficult to 
implement in some contexts since it involves a fundamental change in mindset and 
the way of doing business.
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• Requires strong capacity for implementation. Implementation is not guaranteed 
and it may not affect behaviors at the service delivery or household levels, which are 
critical to nutrition results. On the other hand, if the incentive is sufficiently strong 
and there is sufficient autonomy, the receiving entities may be able to organize 
themselves to deliver, or a complementary technical assistance component could 
be designed into the World Bank operation to address specific implementation 
weaknesses. 
• Requires devolution of authority. PBB requires a strong degree of authority to be 
devolved to the operational levels and the necessary capacity to be built, without 
which the incentives won’t be empowering. PBB may not be suitable in countries 
where sub-national capacities or governance systems are weak or in which the nec-
essary autonomy for delivery is not provided.
• PBB could increase inequities since it rewards better performers. Where sub-na-
tional capacities vary across states or districts, PBB could benefit the already better 
resourced states and districts, which may be the better performers. This could re-
sult in denying the low-performers the very resources that they need to build their 
capacities to perform better, thus perpetuating a vicious cycle of low resources • 
low capacity • low performance • further low resources. This scenario needs to be 
avoided by allocating a minimum level of resources based on need and by adding a 
bonus allocation for performance, rather than making the whole budget dependent 
on performance. Often the lowest performing provinces or districts are also where 
the highest proportions of malnourished people live. Another way to avoid this sce-
nario is to allocate resources based on the rate of change, i.e., whereby sub-national 
units with the greatest improvements from the baseline would receive the largest 
allocations. 
• Risk of focusing on only a subset of results of interest. PBB could skew program at-
tention to selected results at the expense of other important ones, which is the case 
of PforR or any other incentivized financing system. This is a particular challenge 
for nutrition, which has a complex range of determinants requiring several results 
to be tracked. 
• A disconnect may exists between budget and execution. If applied narrowly, this 
instrument’s potential benefits could be limited to priority setting, since it may only 
impact the budget and not necessarily the execution. However, approaches could be 
designed that not only focus on allocations but also on execution of budgets. 
Examples of Country Experience
Argentina, Peru
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 Health Facility Level
• Performance Based Financing (PBF) 
Definition 
• While results-based financing (RBF) is used as a broad term encompassing several 
different types of incentivising results, performance based financing (PBF) usually 
refers to an approach that specifically pays financial incentives to the individual or 
institutional service providers. The payments are based on the quantity and quality 
of outputs delivered. The terms such as “fee for service” or “pay-for-performance” 
are sometimes used to describe this instrument.
• The additional funds from PBF can be used to improve the facility or services, and / 
or to pay “bonuses” to the personnel. How these funds are distributed at the health fa-
cility level and what proportion could be paid as bonuses or salary supplements varies 
widely. In some countries, these decisions are left to the health facility level managers. 
Whereas in other countries, strict guidelines are sent from the central level.
• PBF works best when the unit being contracted (e.g., the health facility) has a high 
degree of autonomy as to how it delivers services. In most countries, however, this 
autonomy is circumscribed by some rules such as public service rules on hiring and 
firing of staff.
• PBF involves a separation of functions between the regulator, purchaser, and service 
provider. It involves contracting an external agency which is responsible for the verifi-
cation and payment of services. A specific package of services is defined and rates are 
applied for each service. Both public and private health facilities can be contracted for 
service delivery, depending on the regulatory framework in the country and the avail-
ability of these providers. Specific catchment areas are defined for each service provider.
• Prior to payment, the quantity of services is verified, usually through the internal 
inspection service of the Ministry of Health. On a less frequent basis (e.g., quarterly) 
community-based organisations undertake counter-verification of the results. This 
counter-verification serves as a “check and balance” against collusion between ser-
vice providers and the inspection services. 
• While PBF has been applied mainly at the health facility level to date, the basic te-
nets of the approach are being increasingly applied at the community level as well as 
at all levels within a health system. The latter enables an alignment of incentives to 
improve service delivery. For example, World Bank projects that use a PBF approach 
in health are increasingly establishing performance contracts not only at the health 
facility level, but also at the other administrative levels of the system (e.g., district, 
provincial) all the way to the regulator at the national level. 
• Some PBF approaches also provide a higher payment to a health facility for having 
reached pre-identified members of the community (through community-based tar-
geting) with free services. These could be the poorest members of the community or 
people with special needs, such as people living with disabilities.  It is likely that this 
targeting is reaching households with a higher likelihood of malnutrition.  
• Increasingly, a quality checklist (some have approximately 200 indicators) is being 
used to assess the quality of services provided, and adjustments in payments (either 
negative or positive incentives) are applied based on the quality checklist score.  
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Potential Strengths 
• Closer to the beneficiary. PBF moves the program resources, incentives, account-
ability, and risks mainly to the health facility level, thus making it more likely to suc-
ceed—if the binding constraints are at that level. In addition, in countries where elite 
capture is a challenge, PBF helps circumvent elite capture at the central level because 
the bulk of the financial resources are directed to frontline health facilities through 
payments directly to their bank accounts.
• Greater social accountability. The counter-verification carried out by community 
organizations is a practical way to empower communities to have oversight over 
service delivery. When nutrition is part of the services being counter-verified, this 
enables communities to improve their understanding and sense of ownership of 
their malnutrition challenge.
• Increased transparency. The management information system for PBF (web portal) 
makes data available publicly about the performance of the health system. This could 
be a valuable source of “real-time” information on some aspects of nutrition services, 
which can be used to review health facility performance more regularly. Data on nu-
trition interventions in most countries is not collected often enough to provide regu-
lar monitoring and accountability.
• Potential to increase the focus on nutrition. By adding specific nutrition services 
to a PBF program, it is possible to enhance the focus and attention to those services, 
which could otherwise be neglected and subsumed under a broader package of ma-
ternal and child health services.
• Increased monitoring and feedback. While the verification of quality and quantity is 
primarily set up to confirm payments, the process also enables service providers to 
get regular feedback and to learn from their mistakes. This could be a useful means 
to increase capacity of service providers to deliver nutrition interventions, compen-
CAMEROON P104525 
HEALTH SECTOR SUPPORT INVESTMENT PROJECT
Project development objective (PDO). 
To increase utilization and improve 
the quality of health services with a 
particular focus on child and maternal 
health and communicable diseases. 
 
Results of interest. Health (improved 
utilization and quality of health ser-
vices), with maternal and under-five 
nutrition results added subsequently. 
Indicators. The original PDO indicators 
were (i) children immunized for DPT3 
(< 12 months); (ii) births attended by 
skilled professional; (iii) children under 
five sleeping under insecticide treated 
bednets the night before the survey; (iv) 
tuberculosis treatment success rate 
(percentage of those who are smear 
positive who are successfully treated); 
and (v) patients reporting satisfaction 
with health services. The following nu-
trition-specific indicators were included: 
under-five children with severe acute 
malnutrition (SAM) and moderate acute 
malnutrition (MAM) treated respec-
tively at the hospital and the primary 
health center (PHC) level; referrals and 
counter-referral for nutrition (teased 
out from the total list of referrals). At 
the community level: patients of SAM 
and MAM referred by the community 
health workers (CHW) to the facility 
(and confirmed); household visits by a 
team (CHW + facility staff) according 
to protocol. At the hospital level, the 
number of inpatient days for SAM.
Operational modality. Improving district 
level health services through PBF at the 
primary health center and hospital level. 
Also extended PBF to the community 
level. Approved in 2009, the operation 
took two years to get off the ground in 
earnest. Between 2011 and 2014, pilots 
were tested and in 2014, additional 
financing enabled nationwide scale up. 
Nutrition indicators were added to the 
existing PBF program in one region. The 
operation is now financing the nutri-
tion outputs throughout the country, 
although the problem primarily affects 
the north and the east. UNICEF pays 
for the nutrition results for one region 
and IDA finances for the other regions. 
Evaluation. The provision of ser-
vices increased, but it is too early 
to evaluate nutrition outcomes. 
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sating somewhat for the often low level of nutrition training which the personnel of 
health facilities receive.
• Sharper focus on the highest priority services. The PBF package of services is a sub-
set of the range of services offered by a facility. The services are chosen on the basis 
of their ability to address the highest burden of disease in the country.  The sharper 
focus on the delivery of these interventions should increase the impact on the highest 
priority public health concerns.
• Greater focus on quality. PBF may improve the impact of some of the key nutri-
tion-specific interventions that could have a significant impact, if they are delivered 
with high quality. For example, growth monitoring and promotion (GMP) has had 
limited impact to date because the focus tends to be on weighing children and the 
quality of the accompanying counseling when a child’s growth is faltering is weak. 
Through the quality checklist, PBF may be able to correct this.
• Tends to improve access to services. An important aspect of PBF is the initial busi-
ness planning that takes place with health facilities to enable them to restructure 
their work so as to maximize their efficiency in service delivery. This can lead to a re-
duction in fees, which in turn increases demand and often not only increases access 
but also improves overall revenue for the health facility.
• May lead to efficiencies in the supply chain. Increasingly, PBF is used to improve the 
alignment of the functioning of the pharmaceutical supply chain with the needs of 
the service providers and clients. These efficiencies would be of benefit to nutrition 
services (independent of whether the service is one of those purchased through PBF 
or not) because breaks in the supply chain are often a major barrier for the delivery of 
nutrition programs. For this benefit to accrue to nutrition, all essential nutrition sup-
plies must be included in the list that is assessed as part of the PBF quality checklist 
for the pharmaceutical system. 
• Encourages greater autonomy. PBF is expected to empower local level managers 
and provide flexibility in ways to achieve the results. The effectiveness of PBF de-
pends largely on autonomy being genuinely granted to health facility level manag-
ers. This autonomy is important for nutrition because different approaches may be 
needed to deliver effective services (especially those which require behavior change) 
depending on the socio-cultural composition of the community.
• May encourage benchmarking and learning. PBF could instill an environment of 
healthy competition among health facilities, especially if financial incentives are 
complemented by non-financial ones. Increasingly, PBF programs are developing 
web portals that contain performance information about each participating unit. In 
addition to increasing transparency, the data enables positive deviance analysis and 
opportunities to learn from the better performers.  Positive deviance is an approach 
that has worked well for nutrition, but mainly at a relatively limited scale so far. PBF 
data systems may enable a scaling up. 
Potential Challenges
• Focus primarily on the supply of services. While PBF could contribute significantly 
to increasing the quality and quantity of some of the nutrition-specific interventions, 
it is insufficient by itself to address malnutrition. So far, PBF’s main limitation for nu-
trition is that it primarily incentivizes service delivery, i.e., the supply side. Nutrition 
interventions also require strong action on the demand side—at the household and 
community levels.
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• Possible resistance. PBF entails a new way of compensating providers and could face 
resistance from staff and bureaucratic hurdles. For example, current rules may not 
allow for payment of bonuses to health care providers. In most settings this chal-
lenge has proven to be manageable, but has required important investments in time 
upfront to explain the benefits of the new approach.
• Potential cost increase. PBF would increase the cost of service provision, since the 
performance pay is in addition to existing compensation and there are additional 
costs related to verification, etc. Generally such additional costs to the system are 
not significant and are considered well worth the results of improved quantity and 
quality of services. Nonetheless, these additional costs need to be assessed against 
the fiscal space for health and the overall cost-effectiveness of the interventions. In 
the case of some preventive nutrition services (and some curative services), which 
concern a large number of individuals in the catchment area (as opposed to disease 
curative services where only the sick come to facilities), the large numbers can result 
in cost escalations, which has been why some nutrition services have not been in-
cluded in the PBF package in the past. This challenge may require further targeting 
of nutrition services.  
• Balancing nutrition with other interventions in the package of services. Only a lim-
ited number of services can be included in a PBF system, which poses a challenge 
as to how many and which nutrition indicators to include. Until recently, the PBF 
package that was most often used had focused on two nutrition services: a growth 
monitoring session (without necessarily focusing on the availability or quality of ac-
companying counseling) and treatment of severe acute malnutrition. Given the poor 
performance of growth monitoring globally and the small proportion of children that 
suffer from severe acute malnutrition (SAM) (compared to stunting), these two ser-
vices are likely to have only limited direct impact on stunting. However, other basic 
health services such as antenatal care, treatment of malaria, treatment of diarrhea 
and child immunization, all of which are typically included in a standard PBF pack-
age, will have an indirect positive impact on nutrition.  
• Verification of certain nutrition services is difficult. One of the strengths of PBF is 
the system of checks and balances through verification and counter-verification. Be-
cause some of the nutrition services relate to behavior change (e.g., exclusive breast-
feeding, complementary feeding, compliance with a regime of iron supplements), 
which are difficult to verify, these high-impact services have tended to be excluded 
from the PBF package. However, some of the newer World Bank operations are test-
ing the limits of the verification challenge. The positive aspect of community count-
er-verification of some of these services is that it could generate local involvement 
and the potential to change community norms related to certain behaviors.
• Capacity to deliver nutrition services. The PBF approach provides health facilities a 
high degree of autonomy to organize themselves to deliver the services which are in-
centivized. Most of these services are at the core of medical training, whereas nutri-
tion often occupies a very limited space in the medical syllabus. It may be necessary 
initially to offer service providers technical assistance to ensure they have sufficient 
capacity to deliver nutrition services. 
• Potential bias against services that are not incentivized. As in any instrument in-
centivizing specific services, other (non-incentivized) services may be neglected. As 
noted earlier, this may pose a problem for nutrition because the services that need to 
be delivered likely exceed the capacity for a PBF to absorb.   
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• Ensuring equitable distribution of the incentive. To avoid conflict among staff, of-
ten the additional funds are just equally shared rather than based on individual per-
formance, even though the whole health facility receives the additional funds based 
on performance. It is much more difficult to institute performance-based rewards at 
the individual provider level without large-scale reform of the human resource (HR) 
systems.
• Workload of community health workers. Some programs are exploring using PBF 
to incentivize community outreach through community health workers. While this 
approach holds promise for nutrition, the community health workers’ range of du-
ties and work volume needs to be consider to assess the feasibility of assigning them 
more tasks.
Examples of Country Experience 
Armenia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Gambia, Ghana, Haiti, Kenya, Lao Peoples 
Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Zimba-
bwe, Zambia  
• Performance Based Contracting (PBC) 
Definition 
• PBC takes place when service delivery is contracted out (or contracted in) often us-
ing non-state actors, e.g., international or national nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) or community-based organizations or for-profit private sector providers, and 
the contracts are performance-based. 
• The contracts focus on the outputs, quality, or outcomes that tie at least a portion of 
the contractor’s payment, contract extensions, or contract renewals to achieving spe-
cific, measureable performance standards. Although any contract would be expected 
to have a performance clause—and could be terminated in the case of non-perfor-
mance—PBC links payment to performance more explicitly and based on specific 
services and outputs to be delivered. 
• A standard package of health services is defined in the contract, which could include 
nutrition services. Performance is usually assessed (and payment made) based on 
delivery of the full agreed package, as opposed to PBF where payments are tied to 
individual services. The verification is at a more macro level than PBF, such as inde-
pendent coverage surveys.
• PBC is usually focused mainly on health facility based services, although it typically 
also includes community activities (e.g., screening for severe acute malnutrition) to 
create demand for facility-based services. 
Potential Strengths
• Competitive selection. Contracted entities have to compete to be selected, and again to 
have their contracts renewed at regular intervals. This competition brings to the fore 
available capacity, which the government may not have been able to tap into previously.
• Alignment. Often the selected entities were already delivering similar services in the 
area (perhaps at a smaller scale) but with relative autonomy from government and with 
direct financing from donors. PBC can serve to align the work of these entities with 
government priorities. 
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• More rigorous than traditional contracts. By linking payment to the quantity and qual-
ity of services delivered, as per agreed checklists, PBC is a better remedy for non-per-
formance than traditional contracts, which usually have only a blunt remedy: the early 
termination of the contract. 
• Rapid increase in provision of services. Particularly in fragile settings where health 
service delivery is compromised and services reduced, PBC usually translates into a 
rapid increase in the availability of services.
• Flexibility in service delivery. Because the contracted NGOs use their own manage-
ment policies and procedures, they have more flexibility than a government entity to 
organize themselves for the particular challenges of service delivery, including hiring 
and firing staff according to needs and offering salaries aligned with market rates to 
attract qualified staff. This flexibility is potentially a significant advantage to deliver 
nutrition services because these often need to be adapted to the local context.
• Multisectoral convergence for results. Because PBC can be geographically based (i.e., 
a given geographical area is assigned to a particular contracted entity) and the enti-
ty is more flexible than traditional government ministries, the approach can facilitate 
multisectoral convergence to achieve certain results. This multisectoral convergence 
is particularly important for nutrition and has been a challenge when working through 
traditional ministries.
• Local acceptability. In areas of conflict, if the selection of the contracted entities places 
a strong emphasis on proof of having worked effectively in the particular context, it is 
likely that the entity will be better accepted by the local communities, as well as the 
parties in conflict. Often, an NGO with a long history of operating successfully in an 
area is selected and brings to the contract not only its technical and managerial capaci-
ty but also its positioning and knowledge of the local political economy.
• Prioritization of services. PBC involves defining a package of services (sometimes in 
tiers, such as a “basic package” an “enhanced package,” etc.), which is to be delivered 
under the contract. The process of defining the package (and adjusting it as needed) 
provides an opportunity to ensure that the health services offered are aligned with the 
burden of disease in the targeted area and with the latest evidence of what works to 
address that burden.  
Potential Challenges 
• Government capacity to enforce contracts. The PBC requires significant capacity 
for contract monitoring and enforcement, which can be lacking in some ministries 
of health. Technical assistance on contract management may be required as part of a 
World Bank operation using PBC.
• Availability of providers. In some settings where PBC has been used (e.g., fragile 
environments), a limited number of national organizations exist with the capacity 
to deliver good quality health services. The competitive selection process needs to 
include international entities, but also ensure that their knowledge and capacity to 
operate in the local environment is a key part of the selection process.
• Challenging to terminate contracts. Termination could be difficult to enforce be-
cause the government will need to find an alternative to continue service delivery 
and PBC can adjust for under-performance or higher performance. Termination re-
quires unequivocal information. 
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AFGHANISTAN P112445 / P129663 
TWO BACK-TO-BACK OPERATIONS INCORPORATED PBC AND PBF
• Perceptions of government about beneficiary expectations. In some settings, the 
government is uncomfortable not being seen by the population as the direct deliverer 
of services. It may be possible to alleviate this apprehension with an effective com-
munication strategy explaining to the public the role of government is to regulate and 
purchase services.
• Prioritizing nutrition. In some settings, nutrition was not well defined in the pack-
age of services and was limited to a few interventions. For example, because some 
NGOs’ recent experience in implementing humanitarian assistance projects focused 
on the treatment of severe acute malnutrition, there can be a tendency to assume that 
this nutrition intervention is sufficient. It may be necessary to review the package 
to define a clear set of nutrition interventions along with indicators to track in the 
information system to determine performance.
• Timing of measurement. In some cases, measurement of PBC performance has been 
done less frequently (i.e., every six or twelve months) than in PBF. Because the avail-
ability of data drives the performance reviews, the less frequent reviews results into 
slower corrections of bad performance and potentially weaker accountability.  
• Cost of measurement. The surveys required to track performance, while useful be-
yond managing PBC contracts, can be costly. These surveys need to include a range 
of nutrition indicators and be well integrated into an overall national health manage-
ment information system and nutrition surveillance system.  
Examples of Country Experience 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Pakistan, South Sudan  
The project development objective 
(PDO) was to contribute to improv-
ing the health and nutritional status 
of the people of Afghanistan, with a 
greater focus on women and children 
and undeserved areas of the country.
 
Results of interest. Improved service de-
livery coverage, including quality of care. 
Nutrition was part of the maternal and 
child health package. Health workers 
sent a report to the Ministry of Health, 
through NGOs, claiming payment for 
the delivery of health services. The 
request is now electronically submitted.  
P129663—SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT FOR HEALTH ACTION IN TRANSITION (SEHAT). P112446—STRENGTHENING  
HEALTH ACTIVITIES FOR THE RURAL 
POOR (SHARP)  Included contract-
ing of NGOs with some performance 
based incentives complemented by 
PBF at the health facility level.
The PDO is to expand the scope, qual-
ity, and coverage of health services 
provided to the population, particularly 
for the poor, in the project areas, and 
to enhance the stewardship functions 
of the Ministry of Public Health. 
Indicators. Almost the same indica-
tors are used for PBC and RBF, mainly 
for maternal and child health, such as 
skilled birth attendance and immuni-
zation coverage. But specific nutrition 
indicators have also been included, e.g., 
pregnant and lactating women receiving 
a package of infant and young child nu-
trition services; and under-five children 
with severe acute malnutrition who are 
receiving the requisite treatment. There 
is also one indicator on quality of care.  
Operational modality and the incen-
tives remain the same as in SHARP 
but performance payments are also 
made at the NGO level. Thus perfor-
mance bonuses are paid not only to the 
individual providers but also to the NGOs 
(20 percent based on performance). The 
implementation of NGO contracting is 
through performance based partnership 
agreements. Significantly, in addition to 
financing the service delivery contracts, 
the operation has considerable amounts 
of resources allocated to capacity build-
ing and system strengthening at the 
central and provincial levels.
Evaluation. Afghanistan has possibly 
the largest PBC operation in health / 
nutrition. Evaluation shows that cover-
age of health services has improved, and 
child / infant mortality has decreased. 
Maternal mortality has also decreased 
significantly.
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 Community Level
•  Performance Based Community Contracts (PBCC) / Community PBF
Definition 
• More recently, in combination with Community Driven Development (CDD) plat-
forms—or sometimes riding on other community mobilization efforts—some coun-
tries have started using performance based community contracts (PBCC) to incentiv-
ize nutrition results. That is a type of PBF at the community level.
• Performance based contracts are signed with community groups and payments are 
made on the basis of results achieved.
• As for PPF, the results are verified before the payment is made and the results can 
include both quantitative and qualitative dimensions.
• Community-PBF can be either stand-alone or linked to operations that also establish 
performance contracts at other levels, e.g., facility, sub-national, and national. 
• Unlike CDD, where the starting point is the community-expressed needs, with PBCC 
/ community-based PBF, the starting point is a specific development objective (e.g., 
reducing child stunting). Intermediate results are selected based on a clear theory of 
change. 
Potential Strengths 
• Collective action. Community-based projects can facilitate collective action that 
would enable the removal of community-wide barriers that are creating nutrition 
problems. Some of these barriers can be social (e.g., social norms related to the role 
of men in caring for young children and / or about open defecation) or physical (e.g., 
building a bridge to ensure easier access to a health facility, or removing conditions 
that enable mosquitos to breed and transmit malaria). Nutrition programs have had 
success in using positive deviance (e.g., identifying which households have less mal-
nutrition in a community and pinpointing which factors have led to that result) to 
identify priority key community barriers to better nutrition. 
• Multisectoral convergence. Community-based projects, if well designed, can en-
courage communities to seek services from various ministries and enable the conver-
gence to take place. This is important for nutrition, which requires a mix of sectoral 
interventions. 
• Flexibility of design. The determinants of malnutrition and the socio-cultural barri-
ers to change will vary by community. Community approaches enable communities 
to adapt global knowledge to their particular situations. However, that adaptation 
may require some external facilitation, e.g., through coaches.
• Flexible definition of community. Communities can be defined geographically, but 
particularly in countries where social exclusion is a challenge, communities can or-
ganize themselves and carry out projects on the basis of characteristics such as eth-
nicity, social class, caste, etc. 
• Quality checklists. Quality checklists, which are generally associated with facili-
ty-level PBF, can also be used in PBCC or community-level PBF. The focus on quality, 
as seen earlier, is critical for the achievement of nutritional outcomes.
• Can promote utilization of services. Community-based contracts can be used to en-
gage community groups to promote the use of health and nutrition services and even 
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do referrals. One such nutrition approach is community screening to identify severe 
acutely malnourished children, an approach which significantly increases the use 
of free nutrition rehabilitation sessions. Some nutrition services, e.g., treatment of 
diarrhea with zinc supplements and oral rehydration solution can be effectively de-
livered in the communities themselves, thus reducing the need to consult a facility 
and addressing the financial barriers that limit access for the poor. 
• Social accountability. Community involvement can create greater accountability at 
the local level, which can lead to a higher degree of transparency and consequently 
greater trust and program acceptance.
Potential Challenges 
• Communities do not always recognize nutrition as a problem. Malnutrition may not 
be seen as a priority problem by communities partly because other pressing needs 
compete for attention, and partly because of lack of awareness about the magnitude 
of the malnutrition problem within the community, its causation, and available solu-
tions. In communities where childhood undernutrition is widely prevalent, people 
may not recognize malnutrition as a critical problem since malnourished child are 
the norm. It may be beneficial to couple community-based PBF with awareness cre-
ation communications campaigns. 
• Challenge of verifying certain nutrition results. The nutrition results that require 
community mobilization often include behaviors that are difficult to verify, e.g., ex-
clusive breastfeeding or child complementary feeding behaviors. Because payments 
are linked to results, there is a risk that communities will learn to report the right re-
sults without the behaviors changing or changing behaviors but not to the extent re-
ported. This challenge is not insurmountable, but it will require creativity of design.
• Potential conflict of interest and capacity constraints for verification. Community 
groups can also play a role in supervision and monitoring the PBCC operation—a 
watch-dog function. But this requires intensive technical assistance, facilitation or 
coaching.
THE GAMBIA P143650 
MATERNAL AND CHILD NUTRITION AND HEALTH RESULTS PROJECT 
Project development objective (PDO). 
To increase the utilization of community 
nutrition and primary maternal and 
child health services in selected regions 
in the country. The results of interest 
include both improved nutrition and 
health among women and children. 
Results of interest. Improved knowl-
edge about exclusive breastfeeding, 
postnatal care, etc., some indicators 
on hygiene, e.g., cleaning up the village, 
etc., and sanitation, such as building of 
latrines, etc. Nutrition-specific results 
included: pregnant / lactating women, 
adolescent girls and / or under-five 
children reached by basic nutrition 
services; children between 6–59 months 
receiving vitamin A supplementation; 
pregnant women receiving iron and 
folic acid supplement; children under 
24 months benefiting from improved 
IYCF practices; and under-five children 
treated for moderate or severe acute 
malnutrition. Under the additional 
financing, the following nutrition-spe-
cific results were added: Baby-Friendly 
Community Initiative villages in the 
region; vulnerable households sup-
ported in gardening; and communities 
supported in establishing food banks.
Indicators. PDO-level indicators were 
children 0–6 months who are exclusively 
breastfed; deliveries attended by certi-
fied midwives in the preceding year; chil-
dren aged 6–59 months who received a 
dose of vitamin A within the past twelve 
months; women using modern methods 
of family planning in the preceding year. 
Under the additional financing, the fol-
lowing PDO-level indicator was added: 
children age 6–23 months consuming 
at least four out of six food groups.
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• Role / presence of the state. Community-based RBF programs need to have an ef-
fective accompanying communications strategy to ensure that communities are 
aware when a program is part of a government strategy to enhance service deliv-
ery. Otherwise, some governments may resist using the approach and risk being 
perceived as having been replaced by community-based organizations “to do the 
government’s job.” 
• Capacity for nutrition. Even when community organizations and their members 
recognize nutrition as a priority, they do not always have the required knowledge to 
analyze the causes of malnutrition in their community or to select evidence-based 
interventions to reduce it. For example, communities sometimes decide to carry 
out growth monitoring, but this is insufficient to improve childhood malnutrition. 
It must be complemented by appropriate nutrition counseling and / or supplemen-
tary feeding interventions demonstrated to caretakers, which is usually referred 
to as growth monitoring and promotion (GMP). This capacity challenge has been 
remedied in some World Bank operations by using tools (e.g., menus of options / 
decision trees) and coaches to facilitate community participation processes, specif-
ically on nutrition. 
• Need local institutional capacity. Though in principle, PBCC (PBF at the com-
munity level) could be used in the absence of a CDD operation, e.g., Cameroon, it 
is critically important to have some sort of community organization with which 
PBCC could operate. Often CDD operations provide the platform on which PBCC 
could be built, by establishing the requisite organizational framework through 
community mobilization efforts. In Djibouti, the existing CDD program provided 
a ready organizational platform. Without such preparatory efforts—either as part 
of CDD or not—or an existing community group such as women’s groups, a health 
promotion committee or a CBO, there would be no locus for PBCC.
• Communities are not always cohesive. Mobilizing communities could be a chal-
lenge, especially with governments that are reluctant to partner with NGOs and 
CBOs. Governments typically are not strong in community mobilization and need 
the help of NGOs or CBOs to accomplish it. Some geographic communities are not 
cohesive socially. In those cases, targeting by socially defined communities may be 
helpful or by introducing additional measures to improve social cohesion such as 
conflict prevention coaching in conflict-affected areas.
Examples of Country Experience 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, the Gambia, Ghana, India (state of Andhra Pradesh), 
Indonesia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Senegal, Nepal
•  Community Driven Development (CDD)
Definition 
• Community Driven Development (CDD) has been practiced for several decades, 
with a view to ensuring that development assistance is not just dictated from the 
top, but that the people’s voices are heard, and development efforts are responsive to 
their expressed needs. Through participatory rural appraisals and other such tech-
niques, CDD increases the involvement and participation of the beneficiaries in the 
planning, implementation, and oversight.
• Financing is provided to communities based on their own plans, addressing their 
own priorities and local approaches. The funds are spent on programs implement-
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ed through community-based organizations with oversight by community leaders or 
committees.
• CDD requires strong community mobilization and capacity building, along with par-
ticipatory planning and implementation. Most governments require technical sup-
port, and the involvement of community-based organizations. 
Potential Strengths 
• Ownership and local relevance. Community interventions in CDD programs are 
more likely to be locally relevant, socially acceptable, and successful due to strong 
community involvement and consequently heightened empowerment compared to 
other development programs. These aspects of CDD approaches are valuable in nu-
trition programs, which are highly dependent on behavior change to succeed, and 
those behaviors are anchored in local norms and traditions.
• Social accountability. Community involvement can create greater accountability at 
the local level, which can lead to a higher degree of transparency and consequently 
greater trust and program acceptance.
• Community contribution. Often communities provide a financial contribution as their 
“share” in the project. This helps build ownership and should enhance sustainability.
• Collective action. Community-based projects can facilitate collective action that 
would enable the removal of community-wide barriers that are creating nutrition 
problems. Some of these barriers can be social (e.g., social norms related to the role 
of men in caring for young children and / or about open defecation) or physical (e.g., 
building a bridge to ensure easier access to a health facility, removing conditions 
that enable mosquitos to breed and transmit malaria). Nutrition programs have had 
success in using positive deviance (e.g., identifying which households have less mal-
nutrition in a community and pinpointing which factors have led to that result) to 
identify priority key community barriers to better nutrition. 
• Multisectoral convergence. Community-based projects, if well designed, can en-
courage communities to seek services from various ministries and enable the conver-
gence to take place. This is important for nutrition, which requires a mix of sectoral 
interventions. 
• Flexibility of design. The determinants of malnutrition and the socio-cultural barri-
ers to change will vary by community. CDD approaches enable communities to adapt 
global knowledge to their particular situations. However, that adaptation usually re-
quires some external facilitation, e.g., through coaches.
• Flexible definition of community. Communities can be defined geographically, but 
particularly in countries where social exclusion is a challenge, communities can or-
ganize themselves and carry out projects on the basis of characteristics such as eth-
nicity, social class, caste, etc. Because some nutrition-related behaviors and barriers 
are specific to some communities, the flexibility inherent in CDD approaches should 
lead to better nutritional outcomes. CDD might be particularly effective in nutri-
tion because several factors affecting nutrition-related behaviors are socio-cultural. 
Those factors include gender discrimination, household resource distribution, wom-
en’s health-seeking behavior, and the feeding and eating practices during pregnancy 
and infancy. 
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Potential Challenges 
• Communities do not always recognize nutrition as a problem. CDD programs sup-
port what communities select as priorities and this may not prioritize malnutrition 
as the most urgent community problem. Malnutrition may not be seen as a priority 
challenge partly because other pressing needs compete for attention, and partly be-
cause of lack of awareness about the magnitude of the malnutrition problem within 
the community, its causation, and available solutions. In communities where child-
hood undernutrition is widely prevalent, people may not recognize malnutrition as a 
critical problem since malnourished children are the norm.
• Risk of elite capture. CDD may not be suitable for communities where a feudal cul-
ture of leadership exists. In such communities, even so-called community engage-
ment may be captured by the most powerful members, defeating the idea of giving 
voice to the poor and vulnerable sections of the society. While a consultative process 
may occur during participatory planning, the process may not be truly inclusive.
• Alignment with national plans. Often communities will request support to build 
physical infrastructure such as health centers and schools. Unless the programs are 
strongly anchored in coordination mechanisms (which are often weak in developing 
countries), there is a risk of building infrastructures when a better solution might 
have been to address transportation problems (e.g., a bridge) to increase access to the 
infrastructures in neighboring communities. Increasingly, countries are developing 
GIS-enabled infrastructure maps (e.g., national health map) that should help CDD 
programs align with national infrastructure plans. This is not a particular risk for 
nutrition programs because community actions for nutrition do not require physical 
infrastructure. 
NEPAL P125359 
COMMUNITY ACTION FOR NUTRITION PROJECT
Project development objective (PDO). 
The original PDO was “to improve 
attitudes and practices known to 
improve nutritional outcomes of 
women of reproductive age and 
children under the age of two.” The 
revised PDO is “to improve practices 
that contribute to reduced undernu-
trition of women of reproductive age 
and children under the age of two 
and to provide emergency nutrition 
and sanitation response to vulnerable 
populations in earthquake affected 
areas.” The project was restructured 
in 2015 to match the project’s results 
framework with community choices.  
Results of interest. This project was 
developed specifically to address 
malnutrition in women of reproductive 
age and children under the age of two.  
Indicators. PDO level indicators, 
revised during restructuring and 
dropping the indicators that sought 
to measure attitudes and refining 
others, include practices of pregnant 
women regarding iron and folic acid 
supplementation; breastfeeding 
practices of mothers with children 0–6 
months of age; child feeding practic-
es of households with children 6–24 
months of age; households reporting 
no smoke in the room while cooking; 
pregnant women reporting consuming 
animal-sourced protein in the previ-
ous day; households reporting using 
improved toilet facilities; mothers (of 
children aged 0–2) reporting always 
washing hands at critical times.
Implementation modalities. At the 
ward level, there is a multisectoral 
committee to approve plans and 
account for results. Communities get 
financing which could include awards 
for households / individuals for their 
achievements, e.g., for households 
using the pit latrine most consistently. 
The Rapid Results Approach, i.e., re-
sults in 100 days, is being used. There is 
a social mobilizer / coach hired through 
the NGO and contracted by the govern-
ment through the project in every vil-
lage development council (VDC). Most 
of the coaches are from the local com-
munity and most of them are women. 
The coach guides the communities, 
assisting them in devising a proposal to 
reduce malnutrition in the community.  
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• Alignment with national systems. Similar to the infrastructure point made above, a CDD 
project may finance a school, but may not have the necessary linkages with the national 
system to ensure that teachers and a regular budget is assigned to operate the school.  
• Role / presence of the state. CDD programs need to have an effective accompanying 
communications strategy to ensure that communities are aware when a CDD pro-
gram is part of a government strategy to enhance service delivery. Otherwise, some 
governments may resist using the approach and risk being perceived as having been 
replaced by community-based organizations “to do the government’s job.” 
• Community contribution. As noted above, the community’s financial contribution 
should help enhance ownership and sustainability, but when criteria are strictly ap-
plied (e.g., insisting on a financial contribution instead of in-kind contribution) the 
poorest communities or the poorest members of communities may be excluded. This 
potential exclusion is highly relevant for nutrition because the poorest households 
tend to be the most affected by malnutrition. 
• Capacity for nutrition. Even when community organizations and their members rec-
ognize nutrition as a priority, they do not always have the required knowledge to ana-
lyze the causes of malnutrition in their community or to select evidence-based inter-
ventions to reduce it. For example, communities sometimes decide to carry out growth 
monitoring, but this is insufficient to improve childhood malnutrition. It must be com-
plemented by appropriate nutrition counseling and / or supplementary feeding inter-
ventions demonstrated to caretakers, which is usually referred to as growth monitor-
ing and promotion (GMP). This capacity challenge has been remedied in some World 
Bank operations by using tools (e.g., menus of options / decision trees) and coaches to 
facilitate community participation processes, specifically on nutrition. 
• Communities are not always cohesive. Mobilizing communities could be a chal-
lenge, especially with governments that are reluctant to partner with NGOs and 
CBOs. Governments typically are not strong in community mobilization and need 
the help of NGOs or CBOs to accomplish it. Some geographic communities are not 
cohesive socially. In those cases, targeting by socially defined communities may be 
helpful or by introducing additional measures to improve social cohesion such as 
conflict prevention coaching in conflict-affected areas. 
• CDD programs are typically dispersed in thousands of small communities. Many of 
them may not have the necessary institutional arrangements, such as a development 
committee or a women’s group to mobilize and articulate their priorities or the ca-
pacity to develop plans and manage programs. This often requires strong technical 
support, usually through NGOs or CBOs. Monitoring the expenditures and results 
could become difficult to manage when the program is dispersed. Information and 
communication technologies are increasingly used to address this challenge. 
Examples of Country Experience 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, the Gambia, Ghana, India (state of Andhra Pradesh), 
Indonesia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Senegal, Nepal
PART II: FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO ENHANCE NUTRITION RESULTS 57
 Household / Individual Level
•  Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) and Unconditional Cash  
Transfers (UCT) 
Definition  
• Cash transfers are provided directly to targeted (poor) individuals and households 
to reduce their vulnerability through consumption smoothing. When used for nutri-
tion, a secondary objective is to encourage behavioral changes that should result in 
improved nutritional outcomes. Such behavioral changes generally revolve around 
feeding and eating practices, girls’ education, caring for infants and children, hy-
giene, and accessing health and nutrition services.   
• Cash transfers can be conditional or unconditional, though the recent trend is toward 
the middle ground of soft conditions—behaviors are encouraged but compliance is 
not verified or enforced. When a nutritional objective is present, the transfers are 
combined with accompanying measures, such as communication campaigns and par-
enting classes, and the cash can be an effective “anchor” for nutrition messages.
• Conditional cash transfers (CCT) involve disbursements based on verified com-
pliance to the prescribed behavior, e.g., accessing institutional delivery, or bring-
ing the baby in for growth monitoring or immunization, or nutrition counselling 
sessions. 
• Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) involve disbursements without a strict re-
quirement for a specific behavior. This approach is more suitable for behaviors 
that are difficult to verify, e.g., exclusive breastfeeding, or increased food intake 
during pregnancy. 
• Soft conditionalities. Even in operations designed as CCT, the conditionality is 
seldom strictly enforced. Beneficiaries are encouraged to attend parenting classes, 
growth monitoring and promotion sessions, cooking demonstrations and so on, but 
the payout is not conditioned upon their participation in such accompanying mea-
sures. Program evaluations suggest that soft conditionalities are just as effective as 
strict conditionalities. 
• Cash transfers have evolved over time, going beyond risk management towards oth-
er development goals, such as reducing malnutrition. If nutrition objectives are to be 
formally superimposed on CCT / UCT operations, it is vitally important to apply the 
relevant knowledge and skills in preparation, implementation, and monitoring, and 
to target the all-important first 1,000 days.  
Potential Strengths 
• Incentivizes behavior change. Cash transfers move the incentive to the intended 
beneficiaries, i.e., the individuals in households whose behavior needs to change to 
improve nutrition (caretakers and those who influence them), and can be very effec-
tive—if designed and implemented well. 
• Targeting the most vulnerable. Cash transfer programs rely on rigorous systems to 
target the most vulnerable, most often through a proxy means test that identifies the 
income poor. Household surveys have shown that these beneficiaries are more likely 
to be malnourished. Using the targeting system of cash transfer programs therefore 
could help to use more efficiently the scarce resources available for nutrition, espe-
cially for preventing undernutrition.
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• Filling a resource gap. Cash transfers are an important part of a national nutrition 
strategy because— at least for the poorest and most vulnerable households—the avail-
ability of financial resources is a determinant of malnutrition.  The cash will enable 
these households to purchase a balanced and safe diet (which is more expensive than 
the typical diets consumed by the poor) and health services. The cash could also free 
up time for caretakers to ensure children received adequate breastfeeding and com-
plementary feeding. 
• Anchoring behavior change messages. The cash transfer itself can serve as an “an-
chor” for nutrition messages, i.e., to capture the attention of household members to 
key nutrition messages that they might otherwise not notice due to competing prior-
ities in their complex lives.
• Addressing gender dynamics. Cash transfer programs can be designed to correct 
household gender imbalances by empowering women. For example, the cash trans-
fers are generally handed out to women rather than to the household head. This is 
likely to benefit nutrition (independent of whether or not nutrition messages are in-
cluded with the cash transfer) because gender inequality is often a strong determinant 
of malnutrition. 
• Efficiency. Direct transfers to individuals through cash transfer programs avoid elite 
capture and other inefficiencies that diminish the proportion of resources that reach 
households. For example, it may be more efficient to provide a household with a cash 
transfer and information encouraging them to purchase a product such as micronutri-
ent powders or zinc tablets from the market rather than providing these same inputs 
for free through the public health system. The act of purchasing would create owner-
ship for the effective use of the product. 
• Rapid response capability. Cash transfer programs provide a platform for rapidly de-
ploying an emergency response to crises such as floods, earthquakes, etc. Rapid de-
ployment could help prevent or reduce the severity of the malnutrition which typical-
ly accompanies emergency situations.
• Strong information systems. Cash transfer programs require strong information sys-
tems to identify beneficiaries, track payments and, in the case of conditional transfers, 
to communicate the conditionalities or “co-responsibilities,” and to verify compliance. 
These same information systems can be used to communicate key nutrition messages. 
• Political visibility. Cash transfer programs tend to be highly visible and usually ben-
efit from strong political support. Adding a nutrition objective to a cash transfer pro-
gram could also raise the profile of nutrition with policy-makers.
Potential Challenges 
• Requires strong management capacity and good governance. Cash transfer programs 
require strong management arrangements to ensure effective administration of the 
cash transfer, mitigating moral hazard, preventing leakage of the cash, and monitoring 
actual compliance in the case of conditional cash transfers. This capacity requirement 
can be a challenge in some countries. 
• Limited feedback loops from UCTs. While UCTs are easier to administer, they do not 
have built-in mechanisms to determine whether the desired behavior change has been 
achieved. Separate surveys or other ways of collecting data may therefore be required. 
• For CCTs, insure the service which constitutes the condition is available. The supply 
of nutrition-related services is often a constraint in countries where malnutrition is 
highly prevalent. An incentive to the providers of the service in question may be help-
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ful. In effect, such cases could combine a demand-side incentive though the CCT with 
PBF to incentivize the supply side. This increases the complexity and potentially the 
cost of the intervention.
• Potential negative impact on intrinsic motivation. When CCT is used to increase the 
utilization of predetermined services, the use of cash alone may affect what otherwise 
may have been an intrinsic motivation to seek a service. It may be possible that the 
prescribed services would not be highly valued by the community and that they may 
consider themselves to simply be paid to use the services, rather than fully valuing the 
usefulness of the service.
• Sometimes financial incentives may not be enough to overcome entrenched beliefs 
and socio-cultural barriers. It is often the case that the barriers to behavior change 
lie at the community level where norms are set.  Therefore, information, education, 
and communication campaigns need to accompany any type of transfers that seek to 
change behaviors, and perhaps also community-based incentives.  
• Risk that the behavior change attained by a cash transfer program may not be sus-
tained after the incentive stops. In nutrition programs, if the cash was intended to 
finance food security and access to health services, it may be necessary to ensure con-
tinued availability of resources over relatively long periods. However, in a cash trans-
fer program, which targeted households with children during the first 1,000 days, 
households could enter the program for a relatively shorter time. Cash transfer pro-
grams are increasingly focusing on concurrently building the capacity of households 
to become more productive so as to eventually “graduate” and become economically 
independent.  
Examples of Country Experience 
Bangladesh, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guate-
mala, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, Lesotho,  Madagas-
car, Mali, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Tanzania 
Project development objective (PDO). 
To provide targeted cash transfers to 
the poor and food insecure households 
and to establish the building blocks 
for a national safety net system. 
 
Results of interest. Poverty allevia-
tion; safety net for the poor and food 
insecure; improving living conditions. 
Increasing access to social services. 
Nutrition is seen as a side effect. A 
nutrition program is being piloted as 
part of this operation. Every under-five 
child and pregnant women will receive 
a nutritional supplement (powdered 
milk + iron supplement + vitamin A), 
along with nutrition education. 
Indicators. Nutrition-specific indica-
tors include poor households / children 
receiving the nutritional package, i.e., 
the powder + education; households 
participating in the nutritional infor-
mation session; households improving 
food consumption score, i.e., weight-
ed score of 20 categories of food.
Operational modality. Unconditional 
cash transfer (UCT) combined with 
behavior change communication (BCC) 
in the five regions of the south—105 
to110 communities of 703 communities 
in the country. The cash transferred 
to poor household is accompanied by 
services and education / information. 
The operation is linked to the National 
Health Insurance. The UCT targets the 
poor, but non-poor households can 
participate in the information session at 
the community level. A total of 62,000 
households have been identified to be 
reached by July 2016. Consideration is 
being given to linking the beneficiaries 
of the UCT with the health program 
so that growth monitoring could be 
added to the operation. On average, 70 
percent of the transfer is spent on food.
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• Public Works Programs (PWP)
Definition 
• A public works program (PWP) involves the provision of temporary paid employ-
ment by the creation of predominantly public goods for targeted beneficiaries. The 
works are generally labor intensive and require few or no skills.
• PWP have traditionally financed the construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure 
(e.g., feeder roads, small dams, etc.) as well as works to preserve the environment 
(e.g., reforestation, terracing, etc.). However, these programs have started financing 
other forms of employment, which are more directly relevant for nutrition, such as 
agriculture and child care.
• A PWP functions as a form of productive social safety net by providing an income 
to targeted households or individuals in exchange for their labor. Payments can be 
in-kind or, more frequently, in cash. Wages are set sufficiently low to avoid substitu-
tion effects with other employment. Targeting is done either on the basis of income 
measures (e.g., proxy means test) or by self-targeting, by setting the wage sufficiently 
low to attract only poor people. Some programs intentionally target women, or have 
women quotas, and provide complementary services (e.g., child care) to enable their 
participation. 
• In light of the obvious limitations of temporary employment, PWP are increasingly pro-
viding complementary services aimed at helping beneficiaries find sustainable liveli-
hoods. They include various types of training, “forced” savings, and matching grants. 
• The programs can be used as part of an overall national social protection strategy and 
/ or provided in response to a humanitarian crisis.
Potential Strengths 
• Target the poor. In addition to the poverty targeting (e.g., proxy means test), when the 
wages are set at the right level, PWPs create a self-targeting mechanism which tends 
to work well because only those poor enough to consider the low wages attractive will 
present themselves for work. Because of the link between poverty and nutrition, the 
participants of PWPs are more likely to belong to households with high levels of mal-
nutrition. 
• Can provide a platform to transmit nutrition messages and build skills. Increasingly, 
PWPs have a longer-term vision and contain skills development training to enable the 
individuals to overcome the barriers that are keeping them trapped in poverty. The 
training sessions offer a platform to transmit information about nutrition. 
• Could have sustainable livelihoods component linked to nutrition-related microen-
terprises. The training and savings component of a PWP could encourage participants 
to develop microenterprises to meet specific nutrition needs of the community. For 
example, participants could develop local low-cost vitamin fortified complementary 
food for children.
• Works can build nutrition-related infrastructure. Even a more traditional PWP 
could apply a nutrition lens in the selection of the infrastructure that would be built or 
rehabilitated. Priorities could include, for example, latrines for girls at schools (to prolong 
school attendance for girls), infrastructure for irrigation, and storage of vitamin rich crops. 
• Good match with intrinsic motivation.  Because they have worked for their wage, the 
incentive may have less negative impact on intrinsic motivation.  Participants would 
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feel they have earned their incentive, thus enhancing the sense of pride and self-re-
spect among the beneficiaries.
• Could provide a platform for community processes. Inasmuch as PWPs are opportu-
nities for people to get together and work together, they could be used as a platform 
to start organizing the community for nutritionally minded collective action, e.g., re-
moving conditions that enable mosquitos to breed and transmit malaria or improving 
access to water and the sanitary environment. The training provided by the program 
could provide a good starting point.
• Potential for inter-sectoral convergence. PWPs provide a great opportunity for in-
ter-sectoral action. The benefits go beyond health or nutrition and could yield broader 
developmental impact. If a PWP sets itself an objective to contribute to improving nu-
trition, it can forge useful linkages with other relevant sectors. For example, the PWP 
can partner with the health system to identify malnourished kids in the families of the 
beneficiary workers, and provide nutrition services where required.
• Flexibility for households. If payments are in cash, households will dispose of ad-
ditional income to spend freely. When combined with appropriate educational pro-
grams, the additional income could be put to good use and enhance food security and 
household nutrition status.
• Non-controversial entry point for nutrition. In countries that may have sensitivities 
related to their malnutrition rates, combining nutrition interventions into an existing 
PWP may be a good way to start remedying the problem.
Potential Challenges  
• Does not reach those who cannot work. Those who are unable to work because of age, 
health status or family responsibilities are excluded from PWPs.  So, complementary 
programs such as cash transfers should be available to reach those households. 
Project development objective (PDO). 
To increase access to safety net and 
disaster risk management systems, 
complementary livelihoods services 
and nutrition support for food inse-
cure households in rural Ethiopia.
Results of interest. Improved house-
hold food security, livelihoods and 
nutrition, and enhanced household 
and community resilience to shocks.  
Indicators. At the PDO-level, the project 
measures progress in transition to a so-
cial protection system; progress towards 
developing improved early warning 
triggers and agreed response mecha-
nisms; the net number of months of food 
insecurity for program participants; 
increase in average value of household 
assets; and access of client households 
to community-based nutrition services, 
including behavioral change communi-
cation provided under the national nutri-
tion program. At the intermediate level, 
the project includes a few nutrition-spe-
cific indicators: clients reporting that 
they can provide adequate meals for 
their family for 12 months a year (male / 
female); transfers that have a value of at 
least 15 kg of cereals and 4 kg of pulses. 
 
Operational modality. Public works 
program with cash or food is given. The 
cash component is the equivalent of 
2,100 calories worth of food, cash or 
e-payment. 80 percent of the house-
holds are paid in return for working in 
the public works. But these public works 
programs include attending behavior 
change sessions. Work requirements 
are exempted for pregnant women and 
those with young children. 20 percent 
of the households receive UCT (house-
holds without able-bodied members). 
The incentives are “soft” (encouraging) 
incentives / “nudges” not “hard” con-
ditions. There has been an evolution 
of increasing attention to nutrition 
under PSNP. In the first PSNP, the only 
conditionality was that Ethiopia should 
have a nutrition policy. In PSNP-4, there 
is much more nutrition sensitivity.  
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• No guarantees that nutrition behaviors will improve. Payments are generally given to 
the workers, which in most cases mean payments will go to men. While poor women 
tend to prioritize investments in human capital when they obtain additional income—
including better quality food, education and health services (all critical inputs for good 
nutrition) —this is less true when the income is controlled by men, especially if the 
PWP does not include communication on nutrition as an accompanying measure.  
• Labor-intensive works can be energy intensive and could actually aggravate mal-
nutrition. Most PWPs require hard physical labor, and the additional food pur-
chased with the wages may not offset the caloric loss (or the worker may simply not 
increase his / her food intake and use the extra money for something else). In this 
situation, aggravating a low body mass index situation is a risk for participants. This 
poses a problem especially for women of child bearing age and would lead to low 
birth weight babies.
• May be difficult to change the mindset. Some public works agencies are accus-
tomed to infrastructure work. It is a mindset change to have them work on social 
sector activities.
• Horizon tends to be short-term. In most cases, beneficiaries of PWP only work for a 
few months (4–6). There is therefore a risk that beneficiaries will focus only on short-
term employment and the current earning needs of their households.  
• Nutrition may not be recognized as a priority. Many of these social safety net pro-
grams may not prioritize nutrition in their results monitoring. They therefore may 
not result in nutritional improvements even if income poverty is alleviated.
• Potential leakage and corruption. In some countries these PWPs are a source of 
corruption through measures such as falsification of worker lists, etc. The problem 
tends to be more acute when payment is in-kind rather than through cash payments 
made directly to individual bank accounts.
Examples of Country Experience 
Argentina, Bangladesh, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Democratic Republic of Congo
Non-Financial Incentives
Effective interventions to achieve nutritional impact will require a mix of financial and non-fi-
nancial incentives. This section provides examples of non-financial incentives that could be con-
sidered at each level of the system. This is not a comprehensive list of non-financial incentives. 
An important first step in selecting non-financial incentives, as well as financial incentives, is to 
define a clear theory of change.  It is also critical to understand the social environment in which 
the interventions will be introduced, including the norms and mental models of the stakeholders 
and beneficiaries. We recommend that readers consult the World Development Report 2015: Mind, 
Society, and Behavior for a more detailed discussion about this topic, which should inspire the 
selection of appropriate intervention design to best use non-financial incentives. 
 National and Sub-National
• Global SUN movement: Prestige of joining “Scaling Up Nutrition / SUN” movement and 
the personal satisfaction related to learning from the SUN tools and networks.
• Costing data: Information on cost-effectiveness of nutrition interventions motivates 
decision-makers to invest for good social returns, e.g., World Bank costing studies.
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• Social change campaigns: Visibility of behavior change campaigns can provide social 
capital for political leaders.
• Bilateral dialogue: When international donors include nutrition as part of their overall 
bilateral political dialogue, high-level decision-makers may be motivated, or in some cases 
coerced, to take action.
• Rankings: International rankings, e.g., Human Development Index, can serve as motivators.
• Visits from leaders / summits: World leaders’ visits and international summits (e.g., World 
Bank meeting on stunting in October 2016) can draw attention to malnutrition and thus 
motivate policy-makers either to seek visibility or to avoid being shamed.
• Campaigns and reports: International campaigns and reports, e.g., Global Nutrition 
Report, can cast attention on the issue. Related in-country media coverage and debates can 
motivate leaders and policy-makers to take action.
• Global events: Events such as World Food Day and the related media coverage can motivate 
leaders and policy-makers to show what they have achieved in nutrition.
• Regular use of data: Annual “nutrition report cards” can generate interest from a range 
of stakeholders and motivate action. These require more robust data systems for nutrition 
than those currently in place.
• Brand recognition: Private companies can get motivated to take action on malnutrition 
because it will boost their brand.  
• Learning opportunities: Leaders, policy-makers and other stakeholders such as journalists 
can be motivated to take action on nutrition through learning events such as conferences 
and targeted training programs (e.g., programs targeted at parliamentarians and media 
leaders).
• Supportive supervision: Program implementers at the national and sub-national level 
could be motivated by the feedback they receive through supervision.
• Recognition: Awards, either to individual leaders or to countries, can be powerful motivators. 
 health facility
• Information tools: Having appealing information tools could motivate health workers to 
undertake good nutrition counseling.  
• Knowledge: Well-trained health workers will be more motivated to include nutrition as 
part of a medical consultation. Too often, nutrition is missing from pre-service or in-ser-
vice training of health workers. 
• Mass media campaigns: While these campaigns are usually aimed primarily at households, 
they have been shown to also have a positive impact on the motivation of health workers. 
• Supportive supervision: Health workers could be motivated by the feedback they receive 
through regular supervision.
• Visibility: A nutrition program could be designed to provide visibility for health facili-
ty workers, conferring them status in the community and possibilities of promotion into 
higher levels of the health system.
• Recognition: Awards are important motivators; these could be for individual workers or 
for entire health facilities.
• Benchmarking: The use of data to establish performance standards and then using these 
standards to compare health facilities, as done in PBF, could be a motivator for health fa-
cility workers.
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• Availability of supplies: Without specific supplies, e.g., zinc supplements, some nutrition 
services cannot be offered. Long periods of stock outs of these supplies could demotivate 
workers to provide these services. Conversely, the availability of the supply could serve as 
a reminder that the services should be offered.  
 Community
• Information tools: Having appealing information tools could motivate the community 
health worker or other community platforms to undertake good nutrition counseling. ICT 
tools appear to boost the status of the community health worker in communities where 
tools such as tablets and smart phone are still a novelty.
• Knowledge: Community workers are more motivated when they feel they have knowledge 
they can bring to the community. For example, the community is motivated by knowledge 
that they can take collective action in areas such as removing the conditions required for 
the transmission of malaria.
• Shame: Some social norms can be shifted through shaming, e.g., shifting the norms sur-
rounding the role of men in child feeding practices, or the norms around open defecation. 
• Data: Communities could be motivated by a sense of accomplishment that would come 
from knowing that their children are growing better or have lower levels of anemia. This 
would require having data platforms that send this signal to communities on a regular basis.
• Positive deviance: Positive deviance analysis, i.e., identifying households in the community 
where children are developing normally despite having access to similar resources, can be 
motivating to communities because it shows them that they have the ability to improve 
their situation with minimal need for external resources. 
• Visibility: Highly visible programs, e.g., vitamin A distributions, can be motivating both for 
caretakers and for workers and thus reach high levels of coverage.
• Priority access to services: In some countries, community health workers may not receive 
a financial payment, but they have priority access to some free services such as health care 
and credit. This can serve as an important motivator, particularly if these services do not 
have the ability to cover the entire community. 
• Mass media campaigns: While these campaigns are usually aimed primarily at house-
holds, they have been shown to also have a positive impact on the motivation of community 
workers.
• Recognition: Awards and other forms of recognition, either to individual workers or to 
entire communities, can serve as important motivators. An example is conferring on a com-
munity the status of being “open defecation free.”
 
 Households
• Information: Parents who learn that well-nourished children perform better in school and 
earn more during their adult years are motivated to take action. Often caretakers are not 
performing certain behaviors because they do not know the benefits of the behavior.
• Growth monitoring: If accompanied by appropriate counseling, growth monitoring can 
be a powerful tool to motivate parents to take action when their child is growth faltering.
• Mass media campaigns: While these campaigns are usually aimed primarily at households, 
they have been shown to also have a positive impact on the motivation of health workers.
• Nudges: Encouraging households that receive a cash payment either as part of a cash trans-
fer program or as part of a public works program could motivate parents to modify their 
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consumption patterns in favor of services and food that improve the nutritional status of 
women and children in the household. 
• Availability of a product: When a product such as micronutrient powders to fortify a child’s 
food directly on the plate is available in the household, it can serve as a motivator to change 
certain behaviors, in this case, starting complementary feeding at six-months of age. 
• Recognition of status: Nutrition-related behaviors in a household involve several individ-
uals, but in the past, most messages have been directed mainly at the mother. Recognizing 
that the grandmother and the father are important decision makers and directly involving 
them in interventions can serve as motivators for behavior change. 
• Gender: Actions to increase the agency of women within the household are important mo-
tivators for these women, which can have an impact on malnutrition. 
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Conclusions
The right nutrition incentives at the right level 
Nutrition is a vital aspect of a country’s universal health coverage (UHC) policy. A well-nour-
ished population contributes to national development and decreases poverty. An undernour-
ished population—particularly malnourished mothers and children—contributes to the cycle of 
poverty that prevents nations from reaching their full potential. Malnutrition is also a driver of 
disparities and a serious impediment to achieving the objectives of key sectors, such as agricul-
ture, education, social protection, and health. The World Bank’s global experience and expertise 
in a range of sectors positions it to assist countries in establishing effective national nutrition 
programs and scaling up existing programs. An effective national nutrition program requires a 
multisectoral approach.
Successfully scaling up a country’s multisectoral nutrition plans require the right incentives, 
including facilitating effective inter-sectoral collaboration and coordination. The financial and 
non-financial incentive mechanisms used effectively in health, education, and social protection 
programs can be equally effective in achieving behavior change to improve nutrition either as 
part of broader World Bank operations or as stand-alone nutrition projects or programs. 
The systematic use of incentives in World Bank-financed operations to achieve nutrition ob-
jectives has been modest to date and deserves more attention. This document has explained 
the various financial and some of the non-financial incentives and at which level they should be 
used, i.e., national, sub-national, facility, community, household or individual. Explicit indicators 
should be included to measure nutrition results within the health, agriculture, education, social 
protection, water and sanitation, and other relevant sector operations.
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An important element to the success of incentivized nutrition operations is identifying ap-
propriate indicators and establishing robust systems to monitor and verify results in order 
to reward good performance promptly. This assumes, of course, the existence or the develop-
ment of the necessary information systems and institutional mechanisms to monitor and evaluate 
nutrition interventions. Nutrition indicators are not always obvious. Most results-based, incen-
tivized operations do not measure nutrition results directly—though many include results that 
indirectly contribute to nutrition, e.g., health status improvements, hygiene and sanitation, etc. 
The main constraint to including explicit nutrition indicators in results-based or incentivized op-
erations appears to be the difficulty in identifying verifiable and easily measureable indicators to 
which payments can be linked. Nevertheless, this is possible, as demonstrated by the successful 
operations mentioned in this document.
Nutrition programs need to identify the most suitable incentives according to context—which 
vary greatly by country and region, and even by community. The starting point in the choice of 
financial and non-financial incentives will be to assess the nutrition system in a given country 
and define a clear theory of change that addresses the most binding constraints. The various in-
centives will be more effective at the different levels and usually, a com-
bination of incentives will be required. Financial incentives need to be 
carefully calibrated with non-financial incentives to achieve a positive 
impact without a negative impact on intrinsic motivation. 
Incentivized approaches for nutrition are implemented within a 
wider political economy context. World Bank staff should seek op-
portunities to generate windows of opportunities and to create them 
if necessary. Nutrition champions need to be identified and supported. 
This might also mean placing the oversight for an operation under the 
Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Social Welfare or other ministries 
where champions could be found with a commitment to nutritional 
goals.  
Because of the very strong role of households and communities in 
determining nutrition status, household and community-based incen-
tive mechanisms may become the more natural choice for nutrition 
operations, such as Community Driven Development (CDD) or Perfor-
mance Based Community Contracts (PBCC), and beneficiary level in-
centives, i.e., Cash Transfers (CT) and Public Works Programs (PWP), 
although Development Policy Financing (DPF), Program for Results 
(PforR), Performance Based Financing (PBF), and Performance Based 
Contracting (PBC) are also feasible, depending on the level at which the 
main constraints are faced.
Supporting Task-Teams and Leaders to Incentivize Nutrition  
Programming
To assist task-teams and leaders in developing, implementing, and monitoring incentivized 
programs for nutrition, as well as in incorporating nutrition results in other relevant operations, 
a Practitioner’s Compendium compliments this report. The compendium offers practical infor-
mation on how plan incentivized operations for improving nutrition results for World Bank cli-
ent countries, along with country examples and nutrition indicators for monitoring progress. 
A number of other resources are available to support task teams in scaling up nutrition, 
including:
• Experienced staff: A group of World Bank staff have technical knowledge and expe-
rience in integrating nutrition into national policies and programs. This group operates as 
Successfully 
scaling up 
a country’s 
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require the right 
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a community of practice and is one of the Global Solutions Groups within the Health, Nu-
trition and Population Global Practice, under the leadership of the Global Solutions Lead, 
Meera Shekar (mshekar@worldbank.org). They can be integrated into World Bank task 
teams to support policy dialogue and operations.
• SWAT team: The staff in the Global Solutions Group for nutrition and short-term consul-
tants are available for rapid mobilization as part of the World Bank response to country re-
quests for technical assistance in policy reform, program design, implementation support 
evaluation, etc. 
• Reference materials: A number of technical guidance notes and other reference 
materials are available to guide teams. See Annex 2 of the Practitioner’s Compendium.
• Trust funds: A number of trust funds are available to support country teams in scaling 
up nutrition, including:
• Japan Trust Fund
• Power of Nutrition Trust Fund
• Global Financing Facility (GFF) Trust Fund for Every Woman Every Child
• Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) Trust Fund
• Strategic Impact Evaluation Fund (SIEF) Trust Fund
• Rapid Social Response (SRS) Trust Fund
• Early Learning Partnership
• Additional support: Several donors and partners are discussing with the World Bank 
how they can best support the Bank in scaling up its financing of operations to prevent 
stunting. 
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ANNEX 1. Evidence Review of Financial Incentive Mechanisms
Background
This annex summarizes a literature review conducted to document the impact of financial in-
centive mechanisms on nutrition-related outcomes in low- and middle-income countries. Spe-
cifically, the review focused on eight mechanisms that the World Bank has incorporated into 
projects and initiatives to incentivize results. The mechanisms include: development policy 
lending, program-for-results, performance-based budgeting, performance-based financing, per-
formance-based contracting, conditional cash transfers, unconditional cash transfers, and public 
works programs.
Methods
This review included studies from six electronic databases: Cochrane Library, EconLit, MED-
LINE, ScienceDirect, Scopus, and Web of Science. The names of each financial incentive mech-
anism, and common synonyms, were used as the search terms. The titles and abstracts of the 
studies were screened for relevance. The full texts of potentially relevant articles were reviewed 
to identify those that met the inclusion criteria. Finally, the reference lists of included articles 
were searched for other relevant studies.
The key inclusion criteria related to study design and outcomes. Included in the study were only 
non-randomized and randomized controlled trials, interrupted-time series analyses, controlled 
before-and-after studies, and pooled cross-sectional studies with matching. For outcomes, the 
only studies included were those that examined anthropometric and nutrition outcomes, nutri-
tion-related health care utilization, and nutrition-related health behavior. For more details about 
the methods and inclusion criteria, please refer to the full review.
If a systematic review had already evaluated the impact of an incentive mechanism on the out-
comes of interest using similar inclusion criteria, we used that review as a starting point for our 
own research. We then only looked for additional studies published after the search date in the 
previous review of that particular incentive. We summarized the evidence in the form of a narra-
tive review. We did not conduct meta-analyses to combine the findings from independent studies, 
given the differences in the study methods used, the designs of the incentive mechanisms, and 
the country settings.
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Results 
1. Development policy loans
No studies were identified that evaluated the impact of development policy loans (DPL) on any 
of the nutrition-related outcomes of interest. A 2015 World Bank report on DPLs found that such 
loans have generally met or exceeded expectations based on the Implementation Completion and 
Results reports. However, more rigorous analyses of such operations are needed to determine 
their effectiveness in meeting the stated aims, as well as DPLs’ suitability for incentivizing nutri-
tion programs.
2. Program-for-results financing and disbursement-linked indicators
No studies were identified which evaluated the impact of program-for-results (PforR) financing 
or disbursement-linked indicators on any of the nutrition-related outcomes of interest. PforR 
financing is relatively new, with the World Bank first piloting it in 2012. In 2015, the Bank pub-
lished a two-year review of the early experiences using the financing instrument. The review 
concluded that PforR financing has been used in a variety of countries and sectors, with im-
plementation broadly on course for most of the operations. However, more rigorous evidence is 
needed to understand the impact of PforR financing on nutrition-related outcomes.
3. Performance based budgeting
For performance based budgeting (PBB), two studies met the inclusion criteria. One randomized 
controlled trial (RCT) was conducted in Indonesia; one controlled before and after (CBA) study 
was conducted in Argentina. Overall, more high-quality evidence is needed to understand the 
impact of this form of budgeting on nutrition-related outcomes.
Two studies evaluated the impact of PBB on nutrition and / or anthropometric outcomes, with 
mixed results. Two studies evaluated the impact of PBB on nutrition-related health care utiliza-
tion and immunization coverage, also with mixed results. No studies were identified that evalu-
ated the impact of PBB on nutrition-related behavior change, such as rates of exclusive breast-
feeding or handwashing.
4. Performance based financing
For performance based financing (PBF), 20 studies met the inclusion criteria. Most were con-
trolled before-and-after studies conducted in Sub-Saharan African countries. A 2012 Cochrane 
review assessed the impact of PBF on health care outcomes and utilization in low- and mid-
dle-income countries. 
Only three studies examined the impact of a PBF scheme on any nutrition or anthropometric 
outcomes—with mixed results. Sixteen studies examined the impact of PBF schemes on the use 
of various nutrition-related health care services. In general, the studies found that PBF schemes 
had no effect on the uptake of antenatal care, but raised the use of postnatal care among women. 
The studies also usually found that PBF increased the use of preventive care but not curative care 
among children. The evidence is mixed on the impact of PBF on the use of vitamin and mineral 
supplements.
Ten studies investigated the impact of PBF on rates of vaccination against various diseases, 
mostly in Burundi and Rwanda. The results were mixed on whether PBF increases immunization 
coverage. Only one study examined the impact of PBF on nutrition-related healthy behavior. It 
found a PBF scheme in Rwanda had no impact on the proportion of women breastfeeding for at 
least six months after birth.
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5. Performance based contracting
For performance based contracting (PBC), seven studies met the inclusion criteria. Most of them 
were controlled before-and-after studies conducted in fragile or post-conflict states. A 2009 Co-
chrane review evaluated the impact of contracting out health care delivery on health outcomes 
and the use of health care services in low- and middle-income countries. 
No studies evaluated the impact of PBC on nutrition and / or anthropometric outcomes. Seven 
studies examined the impact of contracting out and / or contracting in health services on health 
care utilization rates. In general, these schemes improve the coverage of health care services—
with the exception of antenatal care.
Four studies have investigated the impact of PBC on rates of vaccination against various 
diseases. The results were mixed on whether such schemes improve immunization cover-
age. No studies were identified that evaluated the impact of PBC on nutrition-related be-
havior change—such as any increase in the rates of exclusive breastfeeding or handwashing. 
6. Conditional cash transfers
For conditional cash transfers (CCT), 22 studies met the inclusion criteria. Most of the stud-
ies were randomized controlled trials in Latin America. Three systematic reviews, one of them 
published by the Cochrane Collaboration, assessed the impact of CCTs on health outcomes and 
health care use in low- and middle-income countries. 
Thirteen studies analyzed the impact of CCTs on nutrition and / or anthropometric outcomes 
in children. These studies found that CCT programs can improve growth, weight, and height-for-
age in children, as well as reduce the probability of children being anemic, chronically malnour-
ished, stunted, and underweight. However, the results were not significant for all outcomes or for 
all age groups of children. Nine studies examined the impact of CCTs on the use of nutrition-re-
lated health care services. They found that CCT programs increased the frequency of preventive 
health visits by mothers and children, the proportion of women receiving antenatal care, and the 
percentage of children having their nutritional status monitored.
Six studies investigated the impact of CCTs on rates of childhood vaccinations. The results 
were mixed as to whether CCTs improved immunization coverage. No studies were identified 
that evaluated the impact of CCTs on nutrition-related behavior change, such as the rates of ex-
clusive breastfeeding or handwashing.
7. Unconditional cash transfers
For unconditional cash transfers (UCTs), 14 studies met the inclusion criteria. Most of the stud-
ies were randomized controlled trials. A 2015 Cochrane review evaluated the impact of UCTs 
distributed during humanitarian crises in low- and middle-income countries on health outcomes 
and the use of health services. 
Ten studies evaluated the impact of UCTs on nutrition and / or anthropometric outcomes, with 
mixed results. Seven studies examined the impact of UCTs on the use of various nutrition-related 
health care services—also with mixed results.
Only three studies evaluated the impact of UCTs on vaccination rates. None of the studies 
found that UCTs had a statistically significant impact on immunization coverage. No studies were 
identified that evaluated the impact of UCTs on nutrition-related behavior change, such as rates 
of exclusive breastfeeding or handwashing.
8. Public works programs
No studies were identified that evaluated the impact of public works programs (PWP), including 
labor-intensive public works, on any of the nutrition-related outcomes of interest. Two reports 
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published by the World Bank in 2009 and in 2013 documented country experiences with public 
works programs. The reviews pointed to the importance of clear objectives, careful design and 
implementation, and functioning monitoring and evaluation systems. However, more high-qual-
ity evidence is needed to understand the impact of public works programs on nutrition-related 
outcomes.
Discussion
There is evidence that the financial incentive mechanisms reviewed can positively influence 
nutrition and related outcomes among children. However, most of the evidence has focused on 
health outcomes and health care utilization. Far less attention has been paid to nutrition, with the 
notable exception of cash transfers. Scant evidence exists about the impact of incentive mecha-
nisms on nutrition-related health behavior, such as breastfeeding and complementary feeding 
practices.
In many of the studies reviewed, there was variation in the effects of treatment between sub-
groups, e.g., rural versus urban children, and children in different age groups, etc. Also, the results 
were not statistically significant for all nutrition outcomes or for all types of health care services.
The design and implementation of the mechanisms often differs markedly across countries, 
which might explain some of the variations in study findings. The duration of follow-up also 
differed across studies. Therefore, it is difficult to draw general conclusions on the mechanisms’ 
impact.
Not surprisingly, three of the four incentive mechanisms for which little or no evidence was 
found, i.e., development policy loans, program-for-results financing, and performance based bud-
geting, are mechanisms that aim to shape international, national, or sub-national priorities. It is 
difficult to evaluate such types of mechanisms using randomized controlled trials or other rigor-
ous study designs.
Important questions remain about each of the financial incentive mechanisms. The sustainabil-
ity and cost-effectiveness of these mechanisms is uncertain, particularly when it comes to scal-
ing up nutrition programs. It is also difficult to disentangle the effects of individual mechanisms 
when multiple mechanisms are present in a country. Additional research is needed to shed light 
on the relative importance of supply-side and demand-side measures, although that is likely to 
be context-specific.
Finally, most of the studies reviewed have been unable to pinpoint the pathways by which the 
incentive mechanisms improve nutrition. In CCT programs, for instance, the dissemination of 
health, nutrition, and hygiene information to mothers and pregnant women—which is a compo-
nent of most transfer programs—is probably a key factor driving improvement in child nutrition. 
Children are also required to take nutritional supplements as part of some CCT programs. More-
over, the conditions attached to the cash transfers, as well as the size of the transfers, usually dif-
fer across programs. Most studies have not been able determine which of these factors are most 
important in explaining any observed impact.
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TERM DEFINITION (adapted from World Bank. 2013. Improving Nutrition Through 
Multisectoral Approaches. Washington, DC: World Bank.)  
First 1,000 days The period of time, or window of opportunity, from conception to 2 years old, in 
which nutritional requirements are substantial and damage from malnutrition 
is largely irreversible.
Anthropometry The study and techniques of measuring the human body. Anthropometric 
measurements are often used to compare or classify individuals or population 
groups.
Community-based  
management of acute  
malnutrition 
The management of acute malnutrition through (1) inpatient care for children 
with severe acute malnutrition with medical complications and infants under 6 
months old with visible signs of severe acute malnutrition; (2) outpatient care 
for children with severe acute malnutrition; and (3) community outreach.
Complementary feeding The introduction of other foods and liquids when breast milk alone is no longer 
sufficient to meet the nutritional requirements of infants. The transition from 
exclusive breastfeeding to family foods typically covers the period from 6–24 
months old, even though breastfeeding may continue beyond 2 years old. This 
is a critical period of growth during which nutrient deficiencies and illnesses 
contribute globally to higher rates of undernutrition among children under 5 
years old. Complementary food is any food, whether manufactured or locally 
prepared, given in addition to breast milk (or a breast milk substitute) to satisfy 
the nutritional requirements of the child.
Deworming Periodic drug treatment with an anthelmintic to purge the body of 
soil-transmitted helminths, such as roundworm, whipworm, and hook-
worm. Soil-transmitted helminths impair nutrition status through loss 
of iron and protein, and malabsorption of and competition for nutrients. 
WHO estimates that over 270 million preschool children and over 600 mil-
lion school-age children are living in areas where these parasites are inten-
sively transmitted and in need of treatment and preventive interventions. 
Dietary diversity The number of food groups consumed over a given period of time used as an 
indicator of household food security and diet quality.
Double burden of  
malnutrition (DBM) 
The simultaneous occurrence of undernutrition and overweight or obesity in 
the same community, household, or individual. The DBM is linked to two simul-
taneous global transitions: (1) the nutrition transition, which refers to the shift-
ing dietary consumption and energy expenditures that coincide with economic, 
demographic, and epidemiological changes, such as modernization, urbaniza-
tion, economic development, and increased wealth; and (2) the epidemiological 
transition that accounts for the replacement of infectious diseases by chronic 
diseases over time and refers to the pattern of increased population growth 
rates, due to improved public health, sanitation and disease therapy and treat-
ment, followed by a releveling of population growth, due to subsequent declines 
in fertility rates.
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Food security When all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, 
safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life.
Food system A collaborative network that integrates sustainable food production, processing, 
distribution, consumption, and waste management in order to enhance the envi-
ronmental, economic, and social health of a particular place.
Food fortification The addition of one or more micronutrients (vitamins and minerals) to a food 
during processing. Ideally, food fortification provides a public health benefit 
with minimal risks to health in the population. 
Growth monitoring Growth monitoring follows the growth rate of a child in comparison to a stan-
dard by periodic, frequent, anthropometric measurements in order to assess 
growth adequacy and identify faltering early. Growth Monitoring & Promotion 
(GMP) consists of growth monitoring combined with counseling to increase 
awareness of child growth, improve caring practices, and increase demand for 
other nutrition-related services.
Hunger A feeling of discomfort, illness, weakness, or pain due to a prolonged lack of food.
Infant and Young Child 
Feeding (IYCF)
Refers to specific recommendations and guiding principles for feeding children 
between birth and 24 months old for optimal nutrition, health, and develop-
ment. A set of eight core population-level indicators40 have been developed to 
assess feeding trends over time; improve targeting of interventions; and moni-
tor progress in achieving goals and evaluating the impact of interventions.  The 
principles include:
• Early initiation of breastfeeding—initiation of breastfeeding within one 
hour of birth. 
• Exclusive breastfeeding for infants under 6 months old—the feeding of an 
infant only with breastmilk from his or her mother or a wet nurse, or ex-
pressed breastmilk, and no other liquids or solids except vitamins, mineral 
supplements, or medicines in drop or syrup form.
• Continued breastfeeding at 1 year—children 12–15 months old who received 
breast milk during the previous day.
• Introduction of solid, semisolid or soft foods—infants 6–8 months old who 
receive solid, semisolid or soft foods.
• Minimum acceptable diet—a composite indicator consisting of both mini-
mum dietary diversity (children 6–23 months old receiving foods from four 
or more food groups) and minimum meal frequency (children 6–23 months 
old receiving solid, semisolid, or soft foods the minimum number of times 
per day or more).
• Consumption of iron-rich or iron-fortified foods—children 6–23 months 
old who receive an iron-rich food or iron-fortified food that is specially de-
signed for infants and young children or a food that is fortified in the home.
40 WHO (World Health Organization). 2008. Indicators for Assessing Infant and Young Child Feeding Practices. Conclusions of a Consensus Meeting held 
November 6–8, 2007. Washington, DC: WHO.
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Intergenerational  
cycle of malnutrition
Also referred to as the undernutrition cycle, a concept that describes how growth 
failure is transmitted across generations through the mother. The theory links un-
dernutrition in the various stages of development: Small adult women are more 
likely to have low-birth-weight babies; children born with a low birth weight are 
more likely to suffer from growth failure during childhood; girls born with a low 
birth weight are more likely to become small adult women; and adolescent girls 
who become pregnant are even more likely to have low-birth-weight babies.
A child born weighing less than 2,500 grams is categorized as having a low birth 
weight. At the population level, the proportion of infants with a low birth weight 
often serves as an indicator of a multifaceted public health problem that includes 
long-term maternal malnutrition, ill health, hard work, and poor health care in 
pregnancy.
Lean or hunger season Refers to the period between planting and harvesting, when food supplies can be-
come scarce. Families may have to sell livestock, farming tools, and other assets to 
pay for food. During this period, poor farmers are at increased risk for malnutrition.
Malnutrition Poor nutritional status caused by deficiency (undernutrition) or excess. 
Commonly used anthropometric measures of nutrition status include: 
• Stunting (chronic malnutrition)—low height for age, defined as more than 
2 standard deviations below the mean of the sex-specific reference data. 
Stunting is the cumulative effect of long-term deficits in food intake, poor 
caring practices, and illness. 
• Wasting (acute malnutrition)—low weight for height, defined as more 
than 2 standard deviations below the mean of the sex-specific reference 
data. Wasting is usually the result of a recent shock, such as lack of calories 
and nutrients or illness, and is strongly linked to mortality. 
• Underweight—low weight for age, defined as more than 2 standard devia-
tions below the mean of the sex-specific reference data.
Other anthropometric indicators are commonly used for program purposes, 
including: 
• MAM (moderate wasting)—weight for height between 2 and 3 standard 
deviations below the mean of sex-specific reference data. 
• AM (severe wasting)—weight for height more than 3 standard deviations 
below the mean of sex-specific reference data. 
• Global acute malnutrition (moderate and severe wasting combined)—
weight for height more than 2 standard deviations below the mean of 
sex-specific reference data. 
• Moderate malnutrition (moderate underweight)—weight for age between 
2 and 3 z-scores below the mean of sex-specific reference data.
• BMI is a measure of body fat, calculated as weight in kilograms (kg) di-
vided by the square of height in meters (m2). Other measures of nutrition 
status are calculated using BMI. Overweight is defined as a BMI between 
25 and 30 kg/m2. Obesity is defined as a BMI of 30 or more. Although BMI 
is a good measure for determining a range of acceptable weights, it does 
not take into consideration some important factors, such as body build, 
the relative contributions of fat, muscle, and bone to weight.
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Micronutrient  
deficiency
• Also referred to as hidden hunger, the lack of one or more micronutrients, 
often caused by disease or lack of access to or consumption of micronutrient-
rich foods such as fruit, vegetables, animal products, and fortified foods. 
Micronutrients are vitamins and minerals that are needed by the body 
in small amounts to produce enzymes, hormones, and other substances 
essential for proper growth and development. Micronutrient deficiencies 
increase the severity and risk of dying from infectious diseases such as 
diarrhea, measles, malaria, and pneumonia. More than two billion people in 
the world are estimated to be deficient in iodine, vitamin A, iron, or zinc. 
Common micronutrient deficiencies include:
• Anemia—the condition of having a hemoglobin concentration below a 
specified cut-off point, which changes according to age, gender, physiological 
status, smoking habits, and the altitude at which the population being assessed 
lives. WHO defines anemia in children under 5 years old and pregnant women 
as a hemoglobin concentration of less than 110g/l at sea level. It is estimated 
that 50 percent of anemia worldwide is due to iron deficiency. Other causes 
of anemia include malaria and other parasitic infections; acute and chronic 
infections that result in inflammation and hemorrhages; deficiencies in other 
vitamins and minerals, especially folate, vitamin B12, and vitamin A; and 
genetically inherited traits, such as thalassemia.  
• Iron deficiency—the most common nutritional deficiency in the world, 
resulting from insufficient iron in the body due to inadequate consumption 
of bioavailable iron, blood loss, or unmet increased iron requirements due 
to infection, pregnancy, rapid growth, dietary habits, or any combination of 
these.
• Iron deficiency anemia—the condition in which a deficiency in iron causes an 
insufficiency of healthy red blood cells. Iron deficiency and iron deficiency 
anemia are associated with fetal and child-growth failure, compromised 
cognitive development in young children, lowered physical activity and 
labor productivity in adults, and increased maternal morbidity and mortality. 
Women and young children are the most vulnerable to iron deficiency anemia, 
which increases the risk of hemorrhage and sepsis during childbirth, and is 
implicated in 20 percent of maternal deaths. Furthermore, children with 
iron deficiency anemia suffer from infections, weakened immunity, learning 
disabilities, impaired physical development, and in severe cases, death.
• Iodine deficiency—the condition resulting when iodine intake falls below 
the recommended level of 100-199g/l, tested through median urinary iodine 
concentraWtion.
• Iodine deficiency disorders—the consequences of iodine deficiency in a 
population that can be prevented by ensuring that the population has an 
adequate intake of iodine. Iodine deficiency disorders can affect children 
at any stage of rapid growth, with the greatest negative effect on cognitive 
development occurring during pregnancy. Symptoms range from mild 
impairment of brain development and subtle degrees of brain damage, goiter, 
hypothyroidism, reproductive disorders (spontaneous abortion, stillbirth, 
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Micronutrient deficiency,
(continued)
hypothyroidism, reproductive disorders (spontaneous abortion, stillbirth, 
congenital abnormalities, and perinatal mortality) to its most severe form, 
cretinism. Iodine deficiency is the primary cause of preventable mental re-
tardation and brain damage in the world
• Vitamin A deficiency—the condition resulting when vitamin A intake falls 
below recommended levels. Vitamin A deficiency may be exacerbated by 
high rates of infection and greatly increases the risk that a child may die from 
diseases such as measles, diarrhea, and acute respiratory infections. It is the 
leading cause of childhood blindness. Vitamin A deficiency compromises 
the immune systems of approximately 40 percent of the developing world’s 
children under 5 years old and leads to the deaths of as many as one million 
young children each year.
• Zinc deficiency—the condition resulting when zinc intake falls below rec-
ommended levels. Zinc deficiency is associated with growth retardation, 
malabsorption syndromes, fetal loss, neonatal death, and congenital abnor-
malities. Zinc supplementation reduces the duration and intensity of diar-
rheal illnesses and reduces clinical disease caused by acute respiratory in-
fections and malaria.
Nutrition education Encompasses a wide range of efforts to improve nutrition outcomes by chang-
ing nutrition practices, including one-to-one counseling and BCC, and leverages 
available communications channels including IEC, social media, and communi-
ty-level education and mobilization.
Nutrition security The ongoing access to a balanced diet, adequate care and feeding practices, a 
safe and clean environment, clean water, and adequate health care (both pre-
ventive and curative) for all people, and the knowledge needed to care for and 
ensure a healthy and active life for all household members.
Nutrition-sensitive Interventions that address the underlying and basic determinants of maternal, 
fetal, and child nutrition and development, including food security; adequate 
caregiving resources at the maternal, household and community levels; and ac-
cess to health services and a safe and hygienic environment, and incorporate 
specific nutrition goals and actions. Nutrition-sensitive programs can serve as 
delivery platforms for nutrition-specific interventions, potentially increasing 
their scale, coverage, and effectiveness. Examples include programs for agri-
culture and food security; SSNs; early childhood development; maternal mental 
health; women’s empowerment; child protection; schooling; WASH; and health 
and family planning services.41
41 Ruel, M.T., Alderman, H., and the Maternal and Child Nutrition  Study Group. 2013. The Lancet series on Maternal and Child Nutrition. Nutrition-sensitive 
interventions and programmes: how can they help to accelerate progress in improving maternal and child nutrition? Vol. 382: 536-551.
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Nutrition-specific Interventions that have an immediate and direct impact on maternal, fetal, 
and child nutrition and development, including adequate food and nutrient 
intake, feeding, caregiving and parenting practices, and low burden of infectious 
diseases. Examples include adolescent, preconception, and maternal health 
and nutrition; maternal dietary or micronutrient supplementation; promotion 
of optimum breastfeeding; complementary feeding and responsive feeding 
practices and stimulation; dietary supplementation; diversification and 
micronutrient supplementation or fortification for children; treatment of SAM; 
disease prevention and management; and nutrition in emergencies.42
Oral rehydration therapy A type of fluid replacement used to prevent or treat dehydration, especially that 
due to diarrhea, which is defined as the passage of three or more loose or liquid 
stools per day or more frequently than is normal for the individual. Diarrhea is 
usually a symptom of gastrointestinal infection, which can be caused by a variety 
of viral and parasitic organisms. Severe diarrhea leads to fluid loss and plays a 
particularly important role in nutrition and growth faltering, because it can lead 
to malabsorption of nutrients and appetite suppression. The adjusted odds of 
stunting at 24 months old increases by 5 percent with each episode of diarrhea 
in the first 24 months of life.
An oral rehydration solution is a liquid electrolyte solution that is used for the 
management of diarrhea among children. It is typically distributed in ready-to-
use sachets that are added to one liter of clean water.
Psychosocial stimulation The maternal-infant bond formed at the beginning of life is essential for cog-
nitive, emotional, and social development later in life. Feeding and other care 
practices provide opportunities for psychosocial stimulation and help to estab-
lish a positive attachment between caregiver and child.
School garden A small plot or plots within school grounds or nearby—typically managed by 
the schoolchildren with the help of parents, teachers and other community 
stakeholders—where a variety of crops are grown for the purpose of learning, 
recreation, and improving diets. Crops commonly include vegetables, fruits, 
legumes, tubers, and nonfood plants including medicinal herbs, spices, and fuel 
material that are grown throughout the year. Sometimes small livestock and fish 
are raised.
Smallholder farmer Marginal and submarginal farm households that own or cultivate typically less 
than two hectares of land. Smallholder farmer households constitute a large 
proportion of the population in the developing world and of households living 
in poverty and hunger.
42 Ruel, M.T., Alderman, H., and the Maternal and Child Nutrition  Study Group. 2013. The Lancet series on Maternal and Child Nutrition. Nutrition-sen-
sitive interventions and programmes: how can they help to accelerate progress in improving maternal and child nutrition? Vol. 382: 536-551.
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Specialized  
nutritious foods
A wide range of foods aimed at improving nutritional intake, including: 
• Fortified blended foods, such as corn soya blend and wheat soya blend. 
• Point-of-use or ready-to-eat foods, commonly lipid-based nutrient 
supplements, such as ready-to-use therapeutic food, which is a high-energy 
and protein-rich food with added electrolytes, vitamins and minerals, 
specifically designed to treat SAM in the rehabilitation phase, and ready-
to-use supplementary food, which is a high-energy nutrition supplement 
particularly suited as a nutritional support in emergency situations or 
in the context of nutritional programs for the prevention or treatment of 
moderate malnutrition and deficiency-related illnesses. Typically oil- or 
peanut-based, ready-to-use foods do not have to be mixed with water and 
are microbiologically safe to enable outpatient use.
• Micronutrient powders (such as multiple micronutrient powder, multiple 
micronutrients, and micronutrient sprinkles) which are tasteless powders 
that come in individual sachets containing the recommended daily intake of 
16 vitamins and minerals for one person. The powders can be sprinkled into 
home-prepared food after cooking or just before eating.  
• High-energy biscuits are wheat-based biscuits that are easy to distribute 
and can improve the level of nutrition in the first days of an emergency when 
cooking facilities are scarce.
Supplementary feeding A direct transfer of food to target households or individuals, most commonly 
PLW and children. The food may be prepared and eaten onsite or given as a dry 
ration to take home. Supplementary feeding is often provided as an incentive for 
participation in public services such as primary health care and education.
Undernourishment When a person’s usual daily food consumption, expressed in terms of dietary 
energy (kcal), is below the energy requirement norm. An undernourished per-
son is not able to acquire enough food to meet the daily minimum dietary energy 
requirements.
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